We investigate a random proposer bargaining game with a dead line. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome as the number of bargaining periods goes to infinity while the dead line is kept fixed. This limit is close to the Raiffa solution when the time horizon is very short. If the dead line goes...

We study a multiperson bargaining problem with general risk preferences through the use of Shaked’s game of cycling offers with exogenous breakdown. If preferences are “smooth,” then as the risk of breakdown vanishes, the limiting outcome is one in which bargainers are equally marginally bold; where a bargainer’s marginal boldness measures his willingness to risk disagreement in return for a ma...

In experimental tests of human behavior in unstructured bargaining games, typically many joint utility outcomes are found to occur, not just one. This suggests we predict the outcome of such a game as a probability distribution. This is in contrast to what is conventionally done (e.g, in the Nash bargaining solution), which is predict a single outcome. We show how to translate Nash’s bargaining...

Call admission control (CAC) plays a significant role in providing the efficient use of the limited bandwidth and the desired qualityof-service (QoS) in mobile multimedia communications. As efficiency is an important performance issue for CAC in the mobile networks with multimedia services, the concept of fairness among services should also be considered. Game theory provides an appropriate fra...

Currently, communication between nanomachines is an important topic for the development of novel devices. To implement a nanocommunication system, diffusion-based molecular communication is considered as a promising bio-inspired approach. Various technical issues about molecular communications, including channel capacity, noise and interference, and modulation and coding, have been studied in t...

The present article presents and discusses the recent controversy about the possibility and meaning of relating the game theoretic Nash program to mechanism theory. The non-cooperative foundation of the Nash bargaining solution is used as an example to shed light on the formal relation between traditional non-cooperative support of cooperative solutions and mechanism theoretic implementation of...

Nash originated general non-cooperative game theory in seminal articles in the early 1950s by formally distinguishing between non-cooperative and cooperative models and by developing the concept of equilibrium for noncooperative games. Nash developed the first bargaining solution characterized by axioms, pioneered methods and criteria for relating cooperativetheory solution concepts and non-coo...

We use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation. We modify the standard Nash demand game so that incompatible demands do not necessarily lead to the disagreement outcome. Rather, with exogenous probability q, one bargainer receives his/her demand, with the other getting the remainder. We use an asymmetric bargaining set (favouring one bargainer) and disagreement pa...

I give necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a wide class of Rubinstein bargaining models. The requirements encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payo¤ sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. The equilibrium of the non-cooperative game is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend th...

The current framework of Internet interconnections, based on transit and settlement-free peering relations, has systemic problems that often cause peering disputes. We propose a new techno-economic interconnection framework called Nash-Peering, which is based on the principles of Nash Bargaining in game theory and economics. Nash-Peering constitutes a radical departure from current interconnect...