In his pioneering article, (in ‘‘Decision and Organization’’ (C. B. McGuire and R. Radner, Eds.), pp. 297–336, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1972) Hurwicz establishes that there is no strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and individually rational rule for pure exchange economies with two agents and two goods, provided that the domain includes a sufficiently wide class of classical preferences. In this...

In this paper, we study path auction games in which multiple edges may be owned by the same agent. The edge costs and the set of edges owned by the same agent are privately known to the owner of the edges. In this setting, we show that, assuming that edges not on the winning path always get 0 payment, there is no individually rational, strategyproof mechanism in which only edge costs are report...

We show that, in a two-period economy with uncertainty in the second period, if an allocation is Pareto optimal for a given set of beliefs and remains optimal when these beliefs are changed, then the set of optimal allocations of the two economies must actually coincide. We identify equivalence classes of beliefs giving rise to the same set of Pareto optimal allocations. Journal of Economic Lit...

We study pure exchange economies with symmetries on preferences up to taste intensity transformations. In a 2-person, 2-good endowment economy, we show that bilateral symmetry on each utility functional precludes a rectangle in the Edgeworth box as the location of Pareto optimal allocations. Under strictly quasi-concave preferences, a larger set can be ruled out. The inadmissible region is stil...

Simulation-based synthesis tools for analog circuits [1,2] face a problem extending their sizing/biasing methodology to larger block-level designs such as phase lock loops or converters: the time to fully evaluate (i.e., to fully simulate) each complete circuit solution candidate is prohibitive inside a numerical optimization loop. In this paper, we show how to circumvent this problem with a ca...

Skylines with partial order preference semantics often result in huge answer sets and what is worse, they cannot be computed efficiently. In this paper we will explore the evaluation of so-called restricted skyline queries with partial order preferences under the paradigm of weak Pareto dominance. Weak Pareto dominance removes all objects from skylines, which are dominated by other objects in s...

Pareto efficiency is a widely used property in solution concepts for cooperative and non–cooperative game–theoretic settings and, more generally, in multi–objective problems. However, finding or even approximating (when the objective functions are not convex) the Pareto curve is hard. Most of the literature focuses on computing concise representations to approximate the Pareto curve or on explo...

Pareto-efficient consumption in a pure-exchange, one good economy varies over states of nature with respect to only two factors: real aggregate supply and individual utility shocks. One’s optimal contract receipts vary with respect to only these two factors and the ratio of one’s endowment to real aggregate supply. How one’s Pareto-efficient consumption varies with real aggregate supply depends...