in this paper, the notion of the digital divide has been described, and a few analyzing methods of digital divide have been reviewed. analyzing methods of digital divide are called indices which have different indicators and different formulas for calculation. since data collection for an indicator may be difficult, calculating an index is an essential problem. we collected and calculated some ...

Relaxing net neutrality in the form of introducing termination fees and its welfare effects are considered a model imperfect complements. The equilibrium game between internet service provider (ISP) content (CP) yields welfare-maximizing that depend on relative size ISP’s CP’s own-price cross-price effects. Only when own price effect is relatively high compared to CP’s, along with cross effects...

Charities often let the sum of contributions determine the quantity of services to provide. Some organizations, however, have the option of setting a minimum threshold necessary for provision of the public good, allowing donors to pledge donations contingent on the threshold being reached. Contributions are only collected when su±cient funds have been pledged. We show that contribution-maximizi...

We study a dynamic model of information provision. A state of nature evolves according to a Markov chain. An informed advisor decides how much information to provide to an uninformed decision maker, so as to influence his short-term decisions. We deal with a stylized class of situations, in which the decision maker has a risky action and a safe action, and the payoff to the advisor only depends...

We provide a tractable framework for studying the e¤ects of group size and structure on the maximum level of a public good that can be provided in sequential equilibrium in repeated games with private monitoring. We restrict attention to games with "all-or-nothing" monitoring, in which in every period player i either perfectly observes player j’s contribution to the public good or gets no infor...

We prove that in competitive market economies with no insurance for idiosyncratic risks, agents will always overinvest in illiquid long term assets and underinvest in short term liquid assets. We take as our setting the seminal model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), who first posed the question in a tractable model. We reach such a simple conclusion under mild conditions because we stick to the ba...