At the end of the experiment, you will receive a show-up fee of NT$100 plus the NTD converted from the “Standard Currency Units” you have earned in the experiment. (“Standard Currency Units” are the experimental currency units used in the experiment.) The amount of “Standard Currency Units” you will receive, which will be different for each participant, depends on your decision, the decision of...

This paper examines the question of sharing of rights and information in the Take-Grant Protection Model by concentrating on the similarities between the two; in order to do this, we state and prove new theorems for each that specifically show the similarities. The proof for one of the original theorems is also provided. These statements of necessary and sufficient conditions are contrasted to ...

An Electronic voting (E-voting) system is a voting system in which the election data is recorded, stored and processed primarily as digital information. E-voting may become the quickest, cheapest, and the most efficient way to administer election and count vote since it only consists of simple process or procedure and require a few worker within the process. The main task of this paper is to in...

We describe a continuous-speech interface for Quick Medical Reference (QMR), which allows physicians to input spoken descriptions of physical-examination findings, or observations. We analyze the difficulties in designing a continuous-speech interface for systems that use medical terminology. We present a method for matching spoken findings names expressed in natural language to QMR terms. The ...

This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actionsand stable heterogeneity in choices. These properties can also be accurate...

This paper studies the effects of increasing the number of sellers on Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) prices in homogeneous product Bertrand oligopoly markets. We show that the two most commonly used choice functions (power and logistic) lead to qualitatively different comparative-static predictions with respect to the relationship between number of firms and prices. JEL Numbers: C73, D83, L13

This paper presents an experiment that evaluates the effect of financial incentives and complexity in political science voting experiments. To evaluate the effect of complexity we adopt a level-k reasoning model concept. This model by Nagel [1] postulates that players might be of different types, each corresponding to the level of reasoning in which they engage. Furthermore, to postulate the ef...

This paper investigates the implications of normaland extensive-form quantal response equilibrium (QRE) models (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, Games and Economic Behavior; 1998, Experimental Economics) in the ultimatum bargaining game, assuming that players maximize expected monetary payo ̄ s. It is shown that normal-form QRE can select a non-sequential equilibrium, and that the selection depends c...