In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. In this paper we provide an implementation “folk theorem”: for pat...

The necessity for repeated ovariotomy in the same patient is somewhat rare. Of 228 cases of unilateral ovariotomy performed by Spencer "Wells, recurrence in the presumably healthy ovary, necessitating a second operation, was noted in 6 cases; and of 300 cases collected by Pfannensteil in the Breslau Klinik, 6 required a second ovariotomy. Yellitz has collected 135 cases of repeated laparotomies...

We prove that a social choice function is repeatedly implementable if and only if it is dynamically monotonic when the number of agents is at least three. We show how to test dynamic monotonicity by building an associated repeated game. It follows that a weaker version of Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient among the social choice functions that are efficient. As an application, we ...

Three recent papers, published just weeks apart, describe the use of fluorescent TALEs to tag specific DNA sequences in live cells and, in one case, also in fixed cells, the latter with potential clinical applications.

A repeated-measures design is one in which multiple, or repeated, measurements are made on each experimental unit. The experimental unit could be a person or an animal, and repeated measurements might be taken serially in time, such as in weekly systolic blood pressures or monthly weights. The repeated assessments might be measured under different experimental conditions. Repeated measurements ...

I Basic Results on Normal Form Games 3 I.1 The Minmax Theorem 4 I.1.a Definitions and Notations 4 I.1.b A Basic Theorem 5 I.1.c Convexity 6 I.1.d Mixed Strategies 6 I.1.e Note on the Separation Theorem 9 Exercises 10 I.2 Complements to the Minmax Theorem 15 I.2.a The Topology on S 16 I.2.b Lack of Continuity: Regularization 16 I.2.c Lack of Compactness: Approximation 19 I.2.d Measurability: Sym...

Two symmetric players bargain over an infinite stream of pies. There is one exogenously given pie in every period, whose size is stochastic, and the pies are iid. Play can be in a tabula rasa mode or dispute mode. When it is in the former, Nature selects a proposer and a responder with equal probabilities, and a proposal is made by the proposer regarding the division of the present pie. If ther...

This entry shows why self-interested agents manage to cooperate in a long-term relationship. When agents interact only once, they often have an incentive to deviate from cooperation. In a repeated interaction, however, any mutually beneficial outcome can be sustained in an equilibrium. This fact, known as the folk theorem, is explained under various information structures. This entry also compa...

Repeated measures refer to the observations taken on the same subject (plant, animal, person, etc). There is usually a variation among the subjects, which is modeled by random effects. Here is an example. A completely randomized design with a single factor (with fertilizer or without). Each treatment is applied to three plants and the root length of each plant is measured on five occasions (wee...