1 This work was done while George Mailath and Larry Samuelson were visiting the University of Bonn, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowldeged. We thank Ken Binmore for helpful discussions. This is a revision of Section 2 of Mailath, Samuelson, and Shaked [2]. Financial support from the National Science Foundation and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Sonderforschungsbereich 303 at the Uni...

This article introduces the data of the log real GDP per capita ratio and the log real exchange rate which are used to revisit the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis. We acquired the data from IMF and World Bank database, and provide the name and source of the data. All data are openly accessible. Besides, we describe the value of data as well as the method to process the data which can also be found...

Generic extensive form games of perfect information have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Nöldeke and Samuelson (1993) show that in a stochastic evolutionary model also non-subgame perfect equilibriumstrategies may well survive in the long run. In a different model of evolution in the agent normal form of generic extensive form games of perfect information Hart (2002) shows that under suit...

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends that result to games in which the un...