This paper examines critically the contributions of Cournot, Jevons and Walras as the founders of classical mathematical economics from a methodological standpoint. Advances in different economic schools and doctrines in the 19th century produced an environment of multi-dimensionality in economic analysis which was regarded by the pioneers of classical mathematical economists as a chaotic state...

We show that the aggregate excess demand function in an economy with incomplete real asset markets can be characterized by Walras’ law, homogeneity, and continuity around critical prices that cause one-dimensional drop of the dimension of the budget set. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

In this paper I critically analyse the view that John Hicks sought to establish, according to which Walras’ and Marshall’s approaches to price theory, while differing in scope (that is, general vs. partial analysis), are basically similar in their aims, presuppositions and results. By focusing on a special kind of economy (the pure-exchange, two-commodity economy), which has been formally studi...

The demise of the IS-LM model and its replacement by stochastic intertemporal equilibrium models is probably the most salient change that occurred in macroeconomics during the last quarter of the twentieth century, a shift that many commentators have viewed as a Kuhnian scientific revolution. My aim in this paper is to analyse it against the background of what I call the Marshall-Walras divide....

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.

We derive the existence of a Walras equilibrium (WE) directly from Nash’s theorem on noncooperative games. No price player is involved, nor are generalized games. Instead we use a variant of the Shapley–Shubik trading-post game. © 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.