Boghossian (Philos Perspect 8:33–50, 1994) argued (a) that externalism is incompatible with a transparency thesis according to which we can know priori whether any two of our occurrent thoughts have the same or distinct content, and (b) this integral commonsense conception rationality, requires apriority logical abilities. Stalnaker (Our knowledge internal world, Oxford University Press, Oxford...

This formulation of content externalism is very weak, in that most content externalists will want to be more robust—and, of course, more specific—in their construal of the role that environmental factors can play in determining the content of mental states, and will typically take environmental factors to be relevant to the determination of the content of just about any mental state. Neverthele...

The subject of this article is the intertwining between Walter Chatton and William Ockham’s theories about cognitive nature prophetic statements, a topic in theological debate early 14th century. Starting from recent interpretations theory terms distinction externalism internalism, reading some sources where prophecy crucial (for Chatton: Reportatio Super Sententias, I, dd. 38-39, less investig...

I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called ‘externalist’ theory of empirical content, on which the contents of a person’s beliefs are determined in part by the nature of his extra-bodily environmental embedding, with a plausible account of selfknowledge, in particular, of a person’s knowledge of the contents of his own beliefs. A difficulty for this combination is thought to be ...

The No-Miracles Argument (NMA) is often used to support scientific realism.We can formulate this argument as an inference to the best explanation (IBE), but doing so leads to the worry that it is viciously circular. Realists have responded to this accusation of circularity by appealing to reliabilism, an externalist epistemology. In this paper I argue that this retreat fails. Reliabilism suffer...