In an environment of independent private values, we show that k-price auctions (k>2) with a large number of bidders are dominance solvable in two steps. Specifically, if bidders are rational and are certain that their opponents are rational (but without requiring deeper levels of reasoning), then bids converge to true valuations as the economy gets larger. Our model allows for heterogeneity in ...

We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. This class of common-value auctions is characterized by the property that each player’s information set is connected with respect to the common value. We show that the entire class is dominance solvable, and that there is a natural single-valued selection from the resulting set of sophisticated equilibria. Add...

To increase the likelihood of success of their market-focused innovations, firms that develop innovations for targeted markets regularly communicate with market participants in order to reduce the uncertainties participants hold regarding the firms’ innovations. Among other tactics, these firms employ strategic market signals. The paper develops three types of uncertainty (technical, market and...

Gender portrayals in 2,209 network television commercials were content analyzed. To compare differences between three day parts, the sample was chosen from three time periods." daytime, when the audience is mostly women; evening prime time, when the sex of the audience is more evenly distributed," and weekend afternoon sportscasts, when men are a large percentage of the audience. The results in...

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I propose apportioning the United States House of Representatives so as to equalize, to the extent possible, the voting power of the individual voter. Surprisingly such an apportionment falls squarely within the traditional apportionment paradigm and is, in a very precise sense, midway between the Hill method and the Webster method of apportionment.