1. Main instructions for the Double Dictator Game with agreement or no agreement ................2 1.1 Double Dictator Game without agreement....................................................................... 2 1.2 Double Dictator Game with agreement on ‘action 10’ .................................................. 13 2. Main instructions for the Bertrand Game with agreement or no agreement...

Let $B$ be a simple CM abelian variety over field $E$, $p$ rational prime. Suppose that has potentially ordinary reduction above and is self-dual with root number $-1$. Under some further conditions, we prove the generic non-vanishing of (cyclotomic) $p$-adic heights on along anticyclotomic $\Z_{p}$-extensions $E$. This provides evidence towards Schneider's conjecture heights. For elliptic curv...

We investigate the welfare effect of union activity in a relatively new oligopoly model, the Cournot-Bertrand model, where one firm competes in output (a la Cournot) and the other firm competes in price (a la Bertrand). The Nash equilibrium prices, outputs, and profits are quite diverse in this model, with the competitive advantage going to the Cournot-type competitor. A comparison of the resul...

• Two classical models in the theory of oligopoly are those of Coumot (1838) and Bertrand (1883). In both models the equilibrium concept is the noncooperative equilibrium of Nash (1950). In the former firms set quantities. In the latter prices are the strategy variables. In a duopoly situation where firms produce a homogeneous good and marginal costs are constant and equal for both firms, the B...

LAMININ 5 REGULATES POLYCYSTIC KIDNEYS CELL PROLIFERATION AND CYST FORMATION Dominique Joly, Sophie Berissi, Amélie Bertrand, Laetitia Strehl, Natacha Patey and Bertrand Knebelmann. From Université Paris-Descartes, Faculté de Médecine ; Inserm U813; AP-HP Hôpital Necker-Enfants-Malades, Paris, France Address correspondance to : Bertrand KNEBELMANN, Department of Nephrology, Hôpital Necker-Enfan...