In analyses of sponsored search auctions for online advertising, it is customary to model the dynamic game of incomplete information by considering a static games of complete information. This approach is used in Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2007) (EOS), Varian (2007), and the subsequent literature. Modeling complex interactions in uncertain environments as games of complete information has ...

Federated learning (FL) can protect data privacy but has difficulties in motivating user equipment (UE) to engage task training. This letter proposes a Bertrand-game based framework address the incentive problem, where model owner (MO) issues an FL and employed UEs help train by using their local data. Specially, we consider impact of time-varying load channel quality on UE’s motivation task. W...

In this paper, taking the factor of product service provided by manufacturers into consideration, a static Bertrand duopoly game with is studied first, in which these two oligarchs produce differentiated products. A dynamic bounded rationality established using gradient mechanism. Keeping adjustment speeds relatively small range may help long-term stable operation market. It found that there an...

Acknowledgement: I appreciate the constructive comments of Andrew Austin and three anonymous referees for the Journal of Economic Education. Abstract I present a brief classroom demonstration illustrating Bertrand price undercutting. The classroom demonstration is appropriate for Micro Principles, and both intermediate and upper level undergraduate, as well as graduate classes in micro, Industr...

Due to the expansion of container port facilities and many market suppliers, competition among container terminals (CTs) is at the level of threatening the management income and expenditure of port management companies. This paper develops a noncooperative game model and a cooperative game model which involve four CTs located in North Port and two terminals in New port of Busan, Republic of Kor...

Over the years, numerous experiments have been accumulated to show that cooperation is not casual and depends on the payoffs of the game. These findings suggest that humans have attitude to cooperation by nature and the same person may act more or less cooperatively depending on the particular payoffs. In other words, people do not act a priori as single agents, but they forecast how the game w...

Military communities in tactical networks must often maintain high group solidarity based on the trustworthiness of participating individual entities where collaboration is critical to performing team-oriented missions. Group trust is regarded as more important than trust of an individual entity since consensus among or compliance of participating entities with given protocols may significantly...

In repeated games, subgame-perfect equilibria involving threats of punishment may be implausible if punishing one player hurts the other(s). If players can renegotiate after a defection, such a punishment may not be carried out. We explore a solution concept that recognizes this fact, and show that in many games the prospect of renegotiation strictly limits the cooperative outcomes that can be ...

The paper characterizes the mixed-strategy equilibria in all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes that depend positively on own effort and negatively on the effort of competitors. Such auctions arise naturally in the context of investment games, lobbying games, and promotion tournaments. We also provide an experimental analysis of a special case which captures the strategic situation of a two-st...