We study continuous time Bertrand oligopolies in which a small number of firms producing similar goods compete with one another by setting prices. We first analyze a static version of this game in order to better understand the strategies played in the dynamic setting. Within the static game, we characterize the Nash equilibrium when there are N players with heterogeneous costs. In the dynamic ...

In this paper we propose a theory of Bertrand competition where firms form beliefs by considering only a subset of the available variables. This theory of coarse updating leads to equilibria where firms set prices according to constant mark-up strategies, which is consistent with the empirical evidence found in survey data. Moreover it leads to higher prices than the standard theory, which is i...

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Consider a Bertrand model in which each rm may be inactive with a known probability, so the number of active rms is uncertain. This simple model has a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which industry pro ts are positive and decline with the number of rms, the same features which make the Cournot model attractive. Unlike in a Cournot model with similar incomplete information, Bertrand pro ts always ...

This work extends some classical results of Bertrand curves to timelike ruled and developable surfaces using the E. Study map. provides support define two which are offset in sense Bertrand. It is proved that every surface has a if only an equation should be satisfied among their dual invariants. In addition, new theorems concerning developability offsets gained.

Studies on information sharing in oligopolies focus either Cournot or Bertrand markets. We consider a Cournot–Bertrand market where owners provide strategic managerial incentives and can share the details of their compensation contracts. find that firm punishes its manager for sales, whereas rewards sales. Both firms contract if firms' products are sufficiently differentiated. However, product ...

Nos adentraremos en la obra inspirada poemas de Aloysius Bertrand, compuesta por Maurice Ravel.

We show that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, identical to the unique Nash equilibrium, in the classic Bertrand oligopoly model with homogenous goods and identical marginal costs. This provides a theoretical underpinning for the socalled “Bertrand paradox” as well as its most general formulation to date. Our proof generalizes to asymmetric marginal costs and arbitrarily many players in...

We compare the number of active firms, i.e. the number of firms producing a positive quantity, in equilibrium across four different models of oligopoly: Cournot and Bertrand with homogeneous or differentiated goods. We concentrate on the linear demand structure with constant marginal but asymmetric costs. (With symmetric costs, the results trivialize to all firms active or all firms inactive.) ...

'Space and place are central to the strategies and meaning of protest’ (p. xi) reads the opening sentence of Katrina Navickas's latest study, Protest and the Politics of Space and Place 1789–1848. Written, in part, as a response to the 'spatial turn' in History, Navickas makes a cogent and persuasive argument for attending to the importance of the particularities of 'place' rather than the abst...