This paper proposes a discrete analogue of concavity appropriate for potential games with discrete strategy sets. It guarantees that every Nash equilibrium maximizes a potential function. JEL classification: C72.

In a previous essay, we developed a simple (in)efficiency measure for matrix games. We now address the difficulties encountered in assessing the usefulness and accuracy of such a measure. JEL Classifications: C63, C72, D61

We extend the result from Bossert and Sprumont (2013) that every single-valued choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable via strict preferences to the case of choice correspondences via weak preferences. JEL Classification Numbers: C72; D70

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria— equilibria that are not in pure strategies—are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.

We generalize permissibility (Brandenburger, 1992) to allow for any suitably defined model of preference and definition of possibility. We also prove that the generalized solution concept characterizes rationality, caution, and common “belief” of rationality and caution. JEL classification: C72; D81

By introducing the concepts of implicit coalitions and con‡ict of interests in a multiple-player context, this paper generalizes some theorems on policy invariance and equilibrium existence and uniqueness for LQ policy games. JEL: C72, E52, E61

We give examples of strategic interaction which are beneficial for players who follow a "middle path" of balance between pure selfishness and pure altruism. JEL Classification: C70, C71, C72, C79.

We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a component-wise egalitarian allocation of value. We show that when such strongly stable networks exist they coinc...

Self-signaling models predict less selfish behavior in a probabilistic giving setting as individuals are expected to invest pro-social identity. However, there is also substantial evidence that people tend exploit situational excuses for choices (for instance, uncertainty) and behave more selfishly. We contrast these two motivations (identity management self-deception) experimentally order test...