This paper examines the impact of CEO compensation on both firm profitability and risk-taking, from a sample 61 Tunisian non-financial listed companies, during period 2010-2018. For robustness, we have used three different measures; which are ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q. Besides, investigated executive returns volatility. Moreover, controlled for sector interaction to obtain more pertinent results. Con...

Although overconfidence is acknowledged as one of the most common managerial decision-making biases, much uncertainty remains about its implications for firm performance. To resolve this uncertainty, we investigate how and why CEO related to performance using meta-analytic techniques on a sample 199 studies. In particular, relying behavioral decision theory, develop alternative hypotheses regar...

this work concerns the situations in which the framing effects emerge. this has not been an established feature in different studies, so the reasons for its variations have been the subject of various studies since 1980s. present study aimed to determine the variables affecting the feature as well as to address the controversies exist on how these variables affect it. 551 students from engineer...

Deregulation and the relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk-taking The deregulation of the banking industry during the 1990s provides a natural (public policy) experiment for investigating how firms adjust their executive compensation contracts as the environment in which they operate becomes relatively more competitive. Using the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 as a focal point, we invest...

Top management turnover can be classified into forced turnover and voluntary turnover. Forced CEO turnover may be triggered by poorer operating performance (Helwege et al. 2012) that fails to meet the expectation of corporate board; this pressure of immediate performance improvement may induce the incoming CEO to engage in earnings management (SAS No.99, AICPA 2002), and in turn increase the li...

This paper contributes to the literature by examining whether age and gender of firm's top executives influence market-based measures firm risk. Using data on S&P 1500 firms, we document that chief executive officer (CEO) financial (CFO) have a direct effect risk in addition indirect they may through corporate policy choices. Specifically, find firms led older CEOs CFOs less volatile stock retu...

Prior empirical work finds no systematic relation between CEO education and firm performance, which leads to a puzzle as to why firms hire managers with higher educational attainment. This study investigates the link between corporate innovation and managerial talent, indicated by the highest degree achievable, a Ph.D. I find that firms managed by CEOs with Ph.D. degrees (Ph.D. CEOs) produce mo...

We examine how executive compensation affects the cost of debt financing. Analyzing CEO pay data from the UK, we find that debt-like and equity-like pay components have opposite effects on the cost of debt. An increase in defined benefit pensions is associated with lower bond yield spread, while an increase in executive stock options intensifies it. In addition, we find some evidence that cash ...