نتایج جستجو برای: d80

تعداد نتایج: 364  

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2006
Andrew Caplin John Leahy

We introduce a new class of finite horizon stochastic decision problems in which preferences change over time, and provide a proof of the existence of a recursively optimal strategy. Recursive optimization techniques dominate many areas of economic dynamics. However, in decision problems in which tastes change over time, the solution technique most commonly applied is not recursive, but rather ...

2011
Simon Grant Jeff Kline

We focus on syntactic aspects of differential awareness that give rise to contractual disputes. Boundedly rational parties use a common language, but do not share a common understanding of the world, leading to ambiguity in both syntactic and semantic forms. In contractual relationships, ambiguity leads to disagreement and disputes. We show that the agents may prefer simpler less ambiguous cont...

2009
Waka Cheung Yew-Kwang Ng

An optimal decision model is developed to explore the impact of the structure of knowledge on specialization and cooperation in research. It shows that, (1) the degree of specialization in knowledge increases with the depth of knowledge and cooperation efficiency, and decreases with the average number of disciplines that are required for the solution of the problem; (2) the problem which requir...

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2000
Simon Grant Atsushi Kajii Ben Polak

Savage motivated his sure thing principle by arguing that, whenever an act would be preferred if an event obtains and preferred if that event did not obtain, it should be preferred overall. The ability to decompose and recompose decision problems in this way has normative appeal. It does not, however, require the full separability embodied in Savage's axiom. We formulate a weaker axiom that suf...

2011
Kerwin Kofi Charles Melvin Stephens

We argue that, since activities providing political information are complementary with leisure, increased labor market activity should lower voter turnout, doing so least in elections with ubiquitous information. Using county-level data, we find that increased wages and employment: reduce gubernatorial turnout; do not affect Presidential turnout; and raise the share of persons casting a Preside...

2003
Alexander W. Butler

We provide evidence of “soft” information production in investment banking. Using 2191 municipal bond offerings from 1997-2001, we find that “local” investment banks have substantial comparative and absolute advantages over non-local counterparts – locals charge lower fees and sell bonds at lower yields. Local investment banks’ strongest comparative advantage is at underwriting bonds with highe...

2008
Eran Shmaya Leeat Yariv

The analysis of lab data entails a joint test of the underlying theory and of subjects’conjectures regarding the experimental design itself, how subjects frame the experiment. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing such conjectures. We use experiments of decision making under uncertainty as a case study. Absent restrictions on subjects’framing of the experiment, we show that any behav...

2008
Arantxa Jarque

I study a problem of repeated moral hazard in which the effect of effort is persistent over time: each period’s outcome distribution is a function of a geometrically distributed lag of past efforts. I show that when the utility of the agent is linear in effort, a simple rearrangement of terms in his lifetime utility translates this problem into a related standard repeated moral hazard. The solu...

2004
Michael McBride

Individuals in many social networks imperfectly monitor other individuals’ network relationships. This paper shows that, in a model of a communication network, imperfect monitoring leads to the existence of many ine cient equilibria. Reasonable restrictions on actions or on beliefs about others’ actions can, however, eliminate many of these ine cient equilibria even with imperfect monitoring. S...

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2011
Wioletta Dziuda

I analyze a game between an uninformed decision maker and a possibly biased expert. The expert receives a set of arguments, and each argument favors one of two alternatives. He can disclose each argument credibly, but cannot prove whether he has disclosed everything. In all equilibria, the biased expert sends messages containing arguments both for and against his preferred alternative. However,...

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