This paper studies long-run inflation targets and stability in an imperfect information environment. When central banks set an inflation target that is not fully communicated, agents draw inferences about inflation from recent data and remain alert to structural change in their econometric model by forming expectations from a forecasting model that is estimated via discounted least squares. Inf...

In-group favoritism in social dilemma situations is one of the main findings of studies in Social Identity Theory. We investigate what causes the in-group bias: is it due to mere group affiliation or, alternatively, is guilt-aversion a possible explanation? We induce group membership in a minimal group setting, observe in-/out-group transfers and elicit respective beliefs. We find that mere gro...

This paper offers an explanation for stock market crashes which focuses on the role of rational but uninformed traders. We show that uninformed traders can precipitate a price crash because as prices decline, they surmise that informed traders received negative information, which leads them to reduce their demand for assets and drive the price of stocks even lower. The model yields several impl...

In important situations, individual decision-making is systematically biased. When deciding (rather than consuming), extrinsic attributes of choice options are more salient than intrinsic attributes. People overestimate extrinsic attributes and therefore put too much effort into acquiring income and gaining status, lowering their utility level. These mistakes are accentuated in authoritarian sy...

We analyze a simple sunspot model that represents a standard securities market without sidebets on an exogenous sunspot event. The multiple self–fulfilling equilibria that arise in the model are based on investors’ uncertainty about other investors’ beliefs. Hence, these multiple equilibria are “endogenous sunspots.” We show that endogenous sunspots can arise even with complete markets to which...

We study how asymmetric information affects the set of rationalizable solutions in a linear setup where the outcome is determined by forecasts about this same outcome. The unique rational expectations equilibrium is also the unique rationalizable solution when the sensitivity of the outcome to agents’ forecasts is less than one, provided that this sensitivity is common knowledge. Relaxing this ...

The existence of a common prior is a property of the state space used to model the players' asymmetric information. We show that this property is not just a technical artifact of the model, but that it is immanent to the players' beliefs. To this end, we devise a condition, phrased solely in terms of the players' mutual beliefs about the basic, objective issues of possible uncertainty, which is...

In this paper we consider Georgescu-Roegen’s approach to uncertainty, showing that his characterization of expectations cannot be reduced to any probabilistic decision making model. Drawing upon Georgescu-Roegen lesson a lexicographical utility function is proposed and analyzed in the mark of his own peculiar scientific methodology. It is demonstrated that such a formulation can be useful in so...

I study optimal monetary policy in an expectational Phillips Curve environment in which private agents optimally choose their amount of information pertinent to predicting policy. ARCH shocks produce interesting information acquisition (IA) dynamics. Under discretion, IA dynamics cause time-varying effectiveness of policy because of the expectational Phillips Curve; policy may be rendered compl...