Abstract Transactions of any complexity between buyers and sellers are supported by long-term contracts these inevitably incomplete. We propose an approach for overcoming contractual incompleteness based on the idea that most people inclined to follow widely accepted social norms, such as being fair-minded acting with integrity. suggest this tendency can be reinforced if norms incorporated into...

Objective While the incidence of sarcoidosis peaks between 20 and 39 years, it is comparatively low in elderly subjects. We sought to determine whether there are age-dependent differences in the demographic and laboratory characteristics of patients with sarcoidosis. Materials and Methods We retrospectively collected information from our database using the International Classification of Dise...

abstract this article aims to provide theoretical model for analyzing challenge of asymmetric information in the third sector of economy (which is the most important challenge, preventing the growth and development of third sector), using the theoretical foundation of contract theory and incentive theory with regard to the special characteristics of third sector derived by its special structure...

This paper analyzes regulatory design for agroecosystem management on public rangelands. We present an informational and institutional environment where three of the most prominent regulatory instruments on public rangelands – input regulation, cost-sharing/taxation, and performance regulation – can be defined and compared. The paper examines how the optimal regulation is shaped by the informat...

There is a small but growing literature on the theory of the firm based around the “reference point” theory of (incomplete) contracts formulated in Hart and Moore (2008). The reference point approach has been applied to the theory of the firm in Hart (2008, 2009), Hart and Moore (2007) and Hart and Holmström (2010). This introduction reviews the main theoretical aspects of each of these papers....

This paper shows that it is individually rational for agents in a firm to develop and exhibit status concerns. Workers are, by their choices of status concerns, able to transfer surplus from the the firm to themselves. As expected, relative concerns are shaped by the relative strengths and weaknesses of the workers in the firm. Surprisingly, a firm’s profit is reduced relative to the benchmark ...

Holmstrom (1982) argues that a principal is required to restrain moral hazard in a team: wasting output in a certain state is required to enforce efficient effort, and the principal is a commitment device for such enforcement. Under competition in commodity and team-formation markets, I extend his model à la Prescott and Townsend (1984) to show that competitive contracts can exploit the futures...

Commitment to Self-Rewards Self-administered rewards are ubiquitous. They serve as incentives for personal accomplishments and are widely recommended as tools for overcoming self-control problems. However, it seems puzzling why self-rewards can work: the prospect of a reward has a motivating force only if the threat of self-denial of the reward after low performance is credible. We explain how ...

In this paper we investigate sorting patterns among chicken contract producers. We show that the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this contracting game reveals a positive sorting where higher ability producers sort themselves into contracts to grow larger chickens and lower ability types sort themselves into contracts to grow smaller birds. We also show that eliciting this type of sorting b...