In the Target–Attacker–Defender differential game, an Attacker missile strives to capture a Target aircraft. The tries escape and is aided by Defender which aims at intercepting Attacker, before latter manages close in on Target. conflict between these intelligent adversaries naturally modeled as zero-sum game. Game of Degree when able win game has not been fully solved, it addressed this paper...

This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game asymmetric noisy observation. In our model, the follower cannot observe state process directly, but could observation process, while leader can completely process. Open-loop equilibrium considered. The first solve optimal control problem partial observation, maximum principle and verification theorem are obtained. Then turn...

We study the Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) approach for a two-person zero-sum differential game with state constraints and where controls of two players are coupled within dynamics, cost functions. It is known such problems that value function may be discontinuous its characterization by means an HJ equation requires some controllability assumptions involving dynamics set constraints. In this work, we c...