We consider a population of buyers who have unit demand for a homogeneous good, and only differ in terms of how soon they need to purchase it. These buyers have access to a stochastic stream of second-price auctions, as well as posted-price listings that can be used at any time. Using the tools of equilibrium search theory, we characterize the equilibrium bidding dynamics, showing that bidders ...

The analysis of equilibrium in double auctions is complicated, with almost no closed-form examples and with formal results limited to bounds on bidding behavior. We consider the buyer’s bid double auction in a correlated, private values model. Sellers have the incentive to submit their costs as their asks while buyers strategically underbid. We determine (i) the asymptotic distribution of the e...

Evidence on adverse selection in slave markets remains inconclusive. A necessary prerequisite is that buyers and sellers have different information. We study informational asymmetry on the slave markets through notarial acts on public slave auctions in Mauritius between 1825 and 1835, involving 4,286 slaves. In addition to slave characteristics, the acts document the identities of buyers and se...

The focus of this study is application of intelligent agent in negotiation between buyer and seller in B2C Commerce using big data analytics. The developed model is used to conduct negotiations on behalf of prospective buyers and sellers using analytics to improve negotiations to meet the practical requirements. The objective of this study is to explore the opportunities of using big data and b...

This paper closely studies the historical experiences of computer users faced with incompatibility problems. One key point throughout the discussion is that operating system compatibilities and application software were the principal source of switching costs. The larger point here is that vendor specificity is partially a choice-variable for the buyer. It influences many facets of an organizat...

This paper models contracting arrangements between one Seller and one or more Buyers when the ‘‘deliverable’’ or output under the contract is produced in a non-scalable capital-intensive production facility. The basic model proposed allows the Seller and Buyers to negotiate bilateral contracts for the good in advance. On the day, the Seller and Buyers can also sell excess capacity or buy additi...

The theory of competitive auctions offers a coherent framework for modelling coordination frictions as a non-cooperative game. The theory represents an advancement over cooperative approaches that make exogenous assumptions about how output is divided between buyers and sellers and about the forces that bring buyers and sellers into local markets. Moreover, unlike price posting models, which fi...

We investigate premium bidding in online auctions, where an item receives a higher bid than other identical items that currently are for sale and available for a lower bid. We report empirical results that find that premium bidding shares many characteristics with shill bidding, where a seller establishes a new identity to bid on his own product. The results lead us to believe that much of the ...

There is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high-bid auctions (auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid). See for example, Vickrey (1961), Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981), Milgrom and Weber (1982), Matthews (1983), Maskin and Riley (1984), Holt (1980), Cox, Smith and Walker (1988). A critical property on which this literature relies is the existen...

Due to uncertainty and dynamic characteristics from intermittent energy load demand response (DR), the optimal operation of hybrid system is a great challenge. This article proposes an event-triggered multiagent coordinated optimization strategy with two-layered architecture. First, price-bidding-based DR model proposed different stakeholders, it also deduces bidding price Nash equilibrium theo...