there are various ways for estimating velocity of money in economic literature and each has its own specific weaknesses and strengths. particularly, since a great deal of financial innovations and changes have recently taken place affecting the velocity of money, many traditional methods can no langer calculate the equilibrium velocity of money, and they are no longer dependable from the econom...

We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize pool to the winner, provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists. If such an equilibrium fails to exist under the winner-take-all structure, we construct the optimal prize structure which improves existence conditions by dampening efforts. If no such optimal equilibrium exis...

In general, it is clear that open-loop Nash equilibrium and feedback Nash equilibrium do not coincide. In this paper, we study the structure of differential games and develop a technique using which we can identify classes of games for which the open-loop Nash equilibrium is a degenerate feedback equilibrium. This technique clarifies the relationship between the assumptions made on the structur...

Coordination in groups often converges to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium. In this paper we test the effect of changes to the payoff structure, focusing on the effect of increasing versus decreasing the onversus off-equilibrium payoffs, on equilibrium selection in coordination games. Our four treatments change the baseline coordination game payoff structure along two dimensions: 1) changing ...

Two of the most important refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept for extensive form games with perfect recall are Selten’s (1975) perfect equilibrium and Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) more inclusive sequential equilibrium. These two equilibrium refinements are motivated in very different ways. Nonetheless, as Kreps and Wilson (1982, Section 7) point out, the two concepts lead to similar prescr...