Abstract I consider a problem for functional reductionism based on the following tension. Say that b is functionally reduced to . On one hand, and turn out be identical, identity symmetric relation. other implies are asymmetrically related: if , then not Thus we ask, how can related they same thing? propose solution this tension by distinguishing between ontological levels of description.

In Memory: A Self-Referential Account, Fernández offers a functionalist account of the metaphysics memory, which is portrayed as presenting significant advantages over causal and narrative theories memory. this paper, I present series challenges for Fernández’s functionalism. There are issues with both particulars use functionalism more generally. First, in characterizing mnemonic role episodic...

Take functionalism to be the thesis that mental property M is the property of having some other property that plays a certain characteristic causal role R.1 Functionalists are usually physicalists, and so take mental properties to be physically realized, such that for any mental property M, there’s a physical property P that fills R. Causal exclusion looms. Functionalism takes mental properties...

Functionalism offers an account of the relations that hold between behavioural functions, information and neural processing, and conscious experience from which one can draw two inferences: (1) for any discriminable difference between qualia there must be an equivalent discriminable difference in function; and (2) for any discriminable functional difference within a behavioural domain associate...

Some philosophers have conflated functionalism and computationalism. I reconstruct how this came about and uncover two assumptions that made the conflation possible. They are the assumptions that (i) psychological functional analyses are computational descriptions and (ii) everything may be described as performing computations. I argue that, if we want to improve our understanding of both the m...

Mental internalists hold that an individual’s mental features at a given time supervene upon what is in that individual’s head at that time. While many people reject mental internalism about content and justification, mental internalism is commonly accepted regarding such other mental features as rationality, emotion-types, propositional-attitude-types, moral character, and phenomenology. I con...

I-I tll, D.L., 199 1. Landscape planning: functionalism as a motivating concept from landscape ecology and human ecology. Landscape Urban Plann., 2 1: 1319. In this paper, the concept of functionalism fr--r both landscape ecology and human ecology is examined. The conceptual merger of these sciences and their application m landscape planning is explored as a basis for an ‘ecological approach’. ...