We use the methods of evolutionary game theory and computational modelling to examine the evolution of ethnocentrism. We show that ethnocentrism evolves in a spatially structured population not only under prisoner’s dilemma interactions, but also hawk-dove, assurance, harmony, and leader games. In the case of harmony, ethnocentrism evolves even when defection is irrational. This suggests that t...

This study reports a laboratory experiment wherein subjects play a hawk-dove game. We try to implement a correlated equilibrium with payoffs outside the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoffs by privately recommending play. We find that subjects are reluctant to follow certain recommendations. We are able to implement this correlated equilibrium, however, when subjects play against robots that...

An important and open question in monetary economics is how the Federal Reserve makes its policy decisions. We document that when an FOMC member was born, his/her educational background Committee’s changing hawk-dove composition have predictable effects on The odds of being a hawk are higher he/she graduated from university linked to Chicago school economics; instead, dove likely with strong Ke...

The Hawk–Dove game is a well known non-repeating evolutionary game often used as a simple model of biological or economic phenomenon. In the spatial version of this game, complex spatial and temporal dynamics emerge as a direct consequence of “agents” adopting one of two strategies in order to gain a valuable resource. In this study, the population dynamics are investigated in terms of the unde...

In the framework of game theory and cooperation, we study standard two-person population games when agents in the population are allowed to move to better positions in a twodimensional diluted grid. We show that cooperation may thrive for small interaction radius and when mobility is low. Furthermore, we show that, even when the agents cannot change their game strategy, interesting spatial patt...

Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it diffi cult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games including the prisoners’dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will do in one-shot games, evidence suggests that people often use evidential reasoning (ER), i.e., they assign dia...

Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it difficult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games, including the prisoners’ dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will do in one-shot games, evidence suggests that people often use evidential reasoning (ER), i.e., they assign di...

Experimental studies have shown that subjects exhibit a systematic endowment effect. No acceptable explanation for the existence of this behavior has been offered. This paper shows that the endowment effect can be modeled as respect for private property in the absence of legal institutions ensuring third-party contract enforcement. In this sense, “natural” private property has been observed in ...

Animals who live in groups need to divide available resources amongst themselves. This is often achieved by means of a dominance hierarchy, where dominant individuals obtain a larger share of the resources than subordinate individuals. This paper introduces a model of dominance hierarchy formation using a multi-player extension of the classical Hawk-Dove game. Animals play non-independent pairw...

Standard oneand two-population models for evolutionary games are the limit cases of a uniparametric family combining intraand intergroup interactions. Our setup interpolates between both extremes with a coupling parameter κ. For the example of the hawk-dove game, we analyze the replicator dynamics of the coupled model. We confirm the existence of a bifurcation in the dynamics of the system and ...