In this paper, I show that persistent pricing anomalies are consistent with a market that includes ambiguity averse investors. In particular, I show that ambiguity averse investors may prefer to trade based on aggregate signals that reduce ambiguity at the cost of a loss in information. Because the aggregate signals preferred by ambiguity averse investors are not sufficient statistics for the c...

Information asymmetry presents a challenge to equity crowdfunding just as in other markets for equity capital. Investors are less likely to finance startups when it is difficult to assess quality. We argue that syndicates reduce market failures caused by information asymmetry by shifting the focal investment activities of the crowd from startups to lead investors. Syndicates align incentives of...

This study examines the liability of foreignness (LOF) faced by multinational enterprises (MNEs), and the effects of strategies employed to overcome the liability. Based on a sample of 3,085 Sino-foreign joint ventures formed in manufacturing sectors in China, the authors find that Hong Kong investors, who are often perceived to have lower LOF than investors from other countries, are more activ...

We test and confirm the hypothesis that individual investors are net buyers of attentiongrabbing stocks, e.g., stocks in the news, stocks experiencing high abnormal trading volume, and stocks with extreme one day returns. Attention-driven buying results from the difficulty that investors have searching the thousands of stocks they can potentially buy. Individual investors don’t face the same se...

Why don’t VCs eliminate excess demand for follow-on funds by raising fees? We propose a model of learning that leads to informational holdup. Current investors learn about skill whereas outside investors observe only returns. This gives current investors holdup power when the VC raises his next fund: Without their backing, no-one will fund him, as outside investors interpret the lack of backing...

We propose a unified model of limited market integration, asset-price determination, leveraging, and contagion. Investors and firms are located on a circle, and access to markets involves participation costs that increase with distance. Due to a complementarity between participation and leverage decisions, the market equilibrium may exhibit diverse leverage and participation choices across inve...

Traditional economic analysis of markets with asymmetric information assumes that the uninformed agents account for incentives of the informed agents to distort information. We analyze whether investors in the stock market are able to account for such incentive distortions. Security analysts provide investors with information about investment opportunities by issuing buy and sell recommendation...

Theory predicts that attribution bias creates overconfident traders and thus causes excessive trading in the market. This paper tests this prediction by comparing the trading behavior of individual investors in different market conditions. In a bull market, investors suffer more from attribution bias and therefore should be more overconfident and trade more excessively. Using the trading record...

The tension between two margins of information acquisition is studied in a canonical two-period model of portfolio choice. At the intensive margin, an investor chooses the amount of information. At the extensive margin, investors subscribe to the information source. Only if the number of informed investors at the extensive margin is sufficiently small does acquisition of additional information ...

financial literacy of investors reduces uncertainty on future decisions and increases predictability of investment policies in financial markets. thus, the lack of clear information on financial markets is a determining factor in the arrival of domestic and foreign capitals and their quick exit in case of crisis. the lack of transparency and basic knowledge on decisions and failure to provide r...