This paper provides an introduction to the analysis of games with strategic complementarities and applications to industrial organization: oligopoly pricing, comparative statics and a taxonomy of strategic behavior in two-stage games. D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; L13

Applying the Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) decomposition to plant-level manufacturing data from Chile Korea, we find that entry exit of plants account for a larger fraction aggregate productivity growth during periods fast GDP growth. To analyze this relationship, develop model firm based on Hopenhayn (1992). When introduce reforms reduce costs or barriers technology adoption into cali...

To better understand temporary price reductions or “sales,” this paper presents a generalized “clearinghouse” framework of advertised sales and explores some applications. By viewing the firms as competing in utility amending conventional tiebreak rule, we allow for multiple dimensions firm heterogeneity complex market environments. Moreover, (i) provide original insights into number types that...

Interference across competing firms in RCTs can be informative about market structure. An experiment that subsidizes a random subset of traders who buy cocoa from farmers Sierra Leone illustrates this idea. Interpreting treatment-control differences prices and quantities purchased through model Cournot competition reveals differentiation between is low. Combining result with quasi-experimental ...

We study a major new entry in the French mobile telecommunications market, followed by introduction of fighting brands three incumbents. Using an empirical oligopoly model, we find that incumbents’ brand strategies are difficult to rationalize as unilateral best responses. Instead, their consistent with breakdown tacit semi-collusion: before entry, incumbents could successfully coordinate on re...

The integration of markets may improve efficiency by lowering costs or reducing local market power. India, seeking to reduce electricity shortages, set up a new power market, in which transmission constraints sharply limit trade between regions. During congested hours, measures competitiveness fall and firms raise bid prices. I use confidential bidding data estimate the supply simulate outcomes...

This paper develops a real options model of imperfect competition with asymmetric information that analyzes firms’ exit decisions. Optimal exit decision is linked to firm characteristics such as financial leverage and efficiency. The model shows that informational asymmetries between product market rivals can lead more efficient and less leveraged firms to leave the product market prematurely. ...

We develop a model of endogenous mergers to study their dynamic process. Firms choose whether, when, and with whom to merge. Two necessary conditions are identi…ed for mergers to occur: …rm heterogeneity and negative demand shocks. We show that mergers are strategic complements and therefore tend to occur in waves. Moreover, some mergers occur for strategic reasons in order to precipitate furth...

This paper presents a model in which a firm attempts to gain market power by pricing above the competitive market price and simply trying to persuade illinformed consumers not to search for other lower priced firms. Fictitious price comparisons, or false sale signs could be used in this way to deceptively and profitably deter consumer search. A simplified model shows how this mechanism could ex...