The literatures on both authentic leadership and behavioral integrity have argued that leader integrity drives follower performance. Yet, despite overlap in conceptualization and mechanisms, no research has investigated how authentic leadership and behavioral integrity relate to one another in driving follower performance. In this study, we propose and test the notion that authentic leadership ...

In this paper, the optimal adaptive leader-follower consensus of linear continuous time multi-agent systems is considered. The error dynamics of each player depends on its neighbors’ information. Detailed analysis of online optimal leader-follower consensus under known and unknown dynamics is presented. The introduced reinforcement learning-based algorithms learn online the approximate solution...

This paper examines the benefit of sequentiality in the social networks. We adopt the elegant theoretical framework proposed by Ballester et al. (2006) wherein a fixed set of players non-cooperatively determine their contributions. This setting features payoff externalities and strategic complementarity amongst players. We first analyze the two-stage game in which players in the leader group ma...

The leader-follower phenomenon is natural for many mobile objects acting collectively. It is possible to find the leader of such collective motion from trajectory data and use it to understand the motion pattern of the group. This work proposes a technique for detecting leader-follower relationships from trajectories of mobile objects, and represents them as a graph sequence. We apply this meth...

The concept of leader–follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real–world applications of game theory. While the case with a single follower has been thoroughly investigated, results with multiple followers are only sporadic and the problem of designing and evaluating computationally tractable equilibrium-finding algorithms is still largely open. In this work, w...

We consider the following location problem. New 5G networks are deployed by two competitive operators (called resp. O1 and O2), which we refer to as a leader and a follower due to their sequential entering the market. They compete to serve clients by installing and configuring base stations (BS). We assume that the leader had already made a decision and operating a 5G network. Follower arrives ...

Game theoretic approaches to patrolling have become a topic of increasing interest in the very last years. They mainly refer to a patrolling mobile robot that preserves an environment from intrusions. These approaches allow for the development of patrolling strategies that consider the possible actions of the intruder in deciding where the robot should move. Usually, it is supposed that the int...

In the discrete (r | p)-centroid problem two decision makers, a leader and a follower, compete to attract clients from a given market. The leader opens p facilities, anticipating that the follower will react to the decision by opening his own r facilities. The decision makers try to maximize their own profits. This Stackelberg game is Σ 2 -hard. So, we develop a hybrid memetic algorithm for it....