It seems to be a commonplace of the philosophical literature that there is no such thing as moral expertise. Or perhaps, more narrowly, that there is no such thing as justified deference to moral expertise, when there is moral expertise. On the other hand, a warrant for moral deference seems to have a secure place in everyday moral experience. It is illustrated, for example, by the ubiquitous p...

moral origins the evolution of virtue altruism and shame moral originsthe evolution of virtue altruism and shame how did morality originate? b: philosophy, psychology, religion psy/spm 311: origins of moral thought fall 2016: tr, 8:30 book and film reviews document about manuale fiat idea is available on print and evolutionary social theory researchgate the shore of women vaelid back to academi...

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I argue here that good medical ethics requires an empirically-informed moral psychology of medical virtue along with sound action-guiding prescriptions for virtuous medical practice. After distinguishing between three levels of justification, I indicate how medical virtue ethics can draw constructively on relevant empirical research in developing feasible and realistic aspirational standards fo...

The author argues that virtue ethics offers a potentially fruitful framework for approaching Catholic social thought. A virtue-based approach provides a means of connecting a Catholic understanding of social justice to issues of personal morality and moral formation. Three overlapping virtues are proposed as foundational to this approach: solidarity, compassion, and hospitality. The cultivation...

I defend the epistemic thesis that evaluations of people in terms of their moral character as good, bad, or intermediate are almost always epistemically unjustified. (1) Because most people are fragmented (they would behave deplorably in many and admirably in many other situations), one’s prior probability that any given person is fragmented should be high. (2) Because one’s information about s...

Most people use four different approaches when making ethical decisions. Some people use one approach predominantly, while others vary their approaches according to the circumstances. In either case, the approaches usually are chosen unconsciously. A main source of conflict in decision making occurs when two parties argue or negotiate their positions from different moral approaches, for these d...