This paper builds game model to analyze selection issues of IUR co-operation model through Nash bargaining theory. The result shows that, the stronger innovative capability, more economic benefits expected, less technical content of scientific research, companies more inclined to choose a higher degree of close model; otherwise, companies tend to choose more closely integrated degree lower mode.

The main problem of the today’s IEEE 802.11 WLANs is the small number of available channels. In this paper we focus on a novel way of maximization of the network throughput and the provision of fairness which are key challenges in IEEE WLANs, using Game Theory. We examine two types of power control games, namely the non-cooperative and the cooperative power control game. In the case of non-coop...

We model the cross-domain lightpath provisioning in multi-broker based multi-domain SD-EONs as a cooperative game, propose to obtain Pareto-efficient market-share partition for the brokers with Nash bargaining, and design the system framework to realize the proposal.

This paper develops a model of two person family. Each family member attempts to maximize his or her own utility. Yet they are interdependent in two respects. Family members are interdependent, first of all, because they care about each other. Second, there are local public goods or household expenditures within the family, such as housing. The presence of household expenditures means that one ...

In experiments it is typically found that many joint utility outcomes arise in any given unstructured bargaining game. This suggests using a positive unstructured bargaining concept that maps a bargaining game to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than to a single outcome. We show how to “translate” Nash’s bargaining axioms to apply to such distributional bargaining concepts. We th...

This research aims to provide insights into the determinants of channel profitability and the relative power in the channel by considering consumer demand and the interactions between manufacturers and retailers in an equilibrium model. In a departure from the standard empirical channel literature, which assumes that manufacturers set wholesale prices unilaterally, we explicitly model the negot...

The solution to a Nash or a nonsymmetric bargaining game is obtained by maximizing a concave function over a convex set, i.e., it is the solution to a convex program. We show that each 2-player game whose convex program has linear constraints, admits a rational solution and such a solution can be found in polynomial time using only an LP solver. If in addition, the game is succinct, i.e., the c...

A Nash-based collusive game among a finite set of players is one in which the players coordinate in order for each to gain higher payoffs than those prescribed by the Nash equilibrium solution. In this paper, we study the optimization problem of such a collusive game in which the players collectively maximize the Nash bargaining objective subject to a set of incentive compatibility constraints....

The world oil market is modelled as a two-person non-zero-sum game in normal form with each player having a continuum of strategies. The two players are the oil importing nations (OPIC) and the oil exporting nations (OPEC). The game is solved in the noncooperative sense using the equilibrium point solution concept due to Nash. The Nash equilibrium point solution yields an analytic expression fo...

We present a model of multi-party, “spatial” competition under proportional rule with both electoral and coalitional risk. Each party consists of a set of delegates with heterogeneous policy preferences. These delegates choose one delegate as leader or agent. This agent announces the policy declaration (or manifesto) to the electorate prior to the election. The choice of the agent by each party...