We introduce NLK, a model that connects the Nash equilibrium (NE) and Level-K. It allows player in game to believe her opponent may be either less or as sophisticated as, she is, view supported psychology. apply NLK data from five published papers on static, dynamic, auction games. provides different predictions than those of NE Level-K; moreover, simple version explains experimental better man...

By the end of last century there were four areas in mathematical theory positional differential games: non-coalitional games, cooperative, hierarchical and, finally, least-understood coalitional games. In their turn, games are divided into with transferable payoffs (games side payments when players can split profits course game) and non-transferable no such distributions for this or that reason...

We formally incorporate the option to gather information into a game and thus endogenize the information structure. We ask whether models with exogenous information structures are robust with respect to this endogenization. Any Nash equilibrium of the game with information acquisition induces a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game with an exogenous structure. We provide sufficient conditi...

This paper introduces a bottleneck game with finite sets of commuters and departing time slots as an extension of congestion games by Milchtaich (1996). After characterizing Nash equilibrium of the game, we provide sufficient conditions for which the equivalence between Nash and strong equilibria holds. Somewhat surprisingly, unlike in congestion games, a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies may...