It is often important to take country specific institutional features into account in a political economic analysis. We do so in an analysis of Albania. It is argued that the politico-economic system there is characterized by the existence of clans. We study the role of clans by estimating vote functions. The results show major differences across clans in response to government policies. Estima...

This study investigates the politico-economic determinants of the crowding-in effects of public investments in a cross-section of 25 developing countries for the 1975-2000 period using multivariate probit analysis. The estimation results show that public fixed capital investments may crowd in private investments, but this still depends on the developments in the economic, political, and legal e...

Following the collapse of socialism in the late 1980s, Central and Eastern European countries initiated attempts to adopt capitalist economic frameworks and promote entrepreneurship. However, persistent economic difficulties and high levels of unemployment have led to dissatisfaction with political parties favoring capitalism. We integrate identity, institutional, and social movement theories t...

This study takes the limits and failures of policy reforms based on the so-called Washington Consensus as a starting point and argues that effective and feasible economic reforms need a politico-institutional foundation. Since failures in policy reform, poor public management, and rent seeking are interpreted as instances of institutional failure, effective governance structures are required, w...

This paper develops a positive theory of the adoption of child labor restrictions (CLR). The key mechanism in our model is an interaction between parental decisions on family size and their preferences for CLR. While parents with few children have little to gain from child labor and are therefore likely to favor CLR, parents with many working children would be expected to oppose CLR. Fertility ...

We model the political process as consisting of voting on the issue considered salient, public expenditure, with a subsequent consensus over size of government and income taxation. We prove that for each majoritarian choice there is a unique consensus policy on progressivity and government size. We empirically validate the implication that the sign of the relationship between inequality and pro...

Terminal Programs in the Graduate Schools: DR. Discussion: CARD E. SEASHORE ................................................. 213 "Ten-Eighty," a War-produced Rodenticide: E. Obituary: R. KALMBACH. Pectin Intravenously: DR. W. C. HUEPER. "Isosensitivity" Instead of "IsoimmuRoscoe Gilkey Dickinson: DR. LINUS PAULING. nity": DR. ELMER L. DEGOWIN. The Gulf HamAlbert Edward Edgecombe: PROFESSOR HAN...

1 The Economic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 Representative Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1 Policy Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2 Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3 Campaigning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4 Entr...