Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof mechanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, dislike rejections and enjoy confirmation from getting what they declare desirable. Formally, payoff a match decreases its position submitted ranking such that strategic trade-off between preference intensity probability arises. This can trigger commonly observed self-...

In this paper we consider the exogenous indifference classes model of Barberá and Ehlers (2011) and Sato (2009) and analyze further the relationship between the structure of indifference classes across agents and dictatorship results. The key to our approach is the pairwise partition graph. We provide necessary conditions on these graphs for strategy-proofness and unanimity (or efficiency) to i...

We define secure implementation with partially honest agents in a social choice model and we show that strategy-proofness is a necessary and sufficient condition for it. This result offers a behavioral foundation for rectangularity ; and it remains valid even with only one partially honest agent. We apply the concept to a single-crossing voting environment, and we prove that it characterizes th...

We characterize the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic principal–agent model in which the type of the agent may change stochastically over time. We show that, under general conditions, the optimal contract with commitment is renegotiation proof even when type realizations are serially correlated. When the renegotiation-proofness constraint is binding, it is always optimal to part...

We characterize the top trading cycles mechanism for priority-based allocation of indivisible objects when objects have general capacities. We say that a mechanism is top-priority trading-proof if the top ranked agent at any object can never benefit from obtaining (or trading for) a top priority of any agent assigned a copy of this object. This axiom captures a new way that top priorities are r...

The paper considers a voting model where each voter's type is her preference. graph for voter whose vertices are the possible types of voter. Two connected by an edge in if associated “neighbors.” A social choice function locally strategy?proof no can gain misrepresentation to that neighbor true type. arbitrary Local?global equivalence (LGE) satisfied local strategy?proofness implies strategy?p...