This paper investigates three models to implement Tradable Green Certificates (TGC) system with aid of game theory approach. In particular, the competition between thermal and renewable power plants is formulated in three models: namely cooperative, Nash and Stackelberg game models. The price of TGC is assumed to be determined by the legislative body (government) which is fixed. Numerical examp...

Two-player Stackelberg games and their applications to security are currently a very hot topic in the field of Algorithmic Game Theory [7]. In two-player Stackelberg games, instead of having the players move simultaneously, one player is designated as the leader and one as the follower. The game then works as follows: the leader chooses a strategy (possibly mixed) to commit to which the followe...

In common interest games in which players are motivated to coordinate their strategies to achieve a jointly optimal outcome, orthodox game theory provides no general reason or justification for choosing the required strategies. In the simplest cases, where the optimal strategies are intuitively obvious, human decision makers generally coordinate without difficulty, but how they achieve this is ...

Building on the successful applications of Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) to protect infrastructure, researchers have begun focusing on applying game theory to green security domains such as protection of endangered animals and fish stocks. Previous efforts in these domains optimize defender strategies based on the standard Stackelberg assumption that the adversaries become fully aware of th...

In this paper, several seller–buyer supply chain models are proposed which incorporate both cost factors as well as elements of competition and cooperation between seller and buyer. We assume that unit marketing expenditure and unit price charged by the buyer influence the demand of the product being sold. The relationships between seller and buyer will be modeled by non-cooperative and coopera...

The main result in this short note is that the integral form of the LeitmannStalford sufficiency conditions can be verified for a class of optimal control problems whose Hamiltonian is not concave with respect to the state variable. The main requirement for this class of problems is that the dynamics is sufficiently dissipative. An application to a Stackelberg differential game between a produc...

This paper studies timing games in continuous time where payoffs are stochastic, strongly Markovian, and spectrally negative. The main interest is in characterizing equilibria where players preempt each other along almost every sample path as opposed to equilibria where one of the players acts as if she were the (exogenously determined) leader in a Stackelberg game. It is found that the existen...

Abstract— This paper, considers a marketed small-cell caching system comprising of a Network Service Provider (NSP), a number of Video Retailers (VR), and Mobile Users (MU). The NSP rents its SBSs to the VRs intending benefits. Stackelberg game framework is used for addressing the SBSs as a particular type of resources. The MUs and SBSs as autonomous Poisson Point Processes (PPP) are used to de...

We study a supply chain in which a consumer goods manufacturer sells its product through a retailer. The retailer undertakes promotional expenditures, such as advertising, to increase sales and to compete against other retailer(s). The manufacturer supports the retailer’s promotional expenditure through a cooperative advertising program by reimbursing a portion (called the subsidy rate) of the ...

It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to study the former separately (as it applies to the original representation of the game), or should we entirely subordinate it to the latter? The answer probably depends on the particular circumstances, and ind...