This article examines shelf-space allocation and pricing decisions in the marketing channel as the results of a static game played à la Stackelberg between two manufacturers of competing brands and one retailer. The competing manufacturers act as leaders that play a simultaneous and noncooperative game. They fix their transfer prices by taking into account the shelf-space allocation and price-m...

Bayesian Stackelberg games have been used to compute optimal patrol strategies for the security of the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) by modelling the security situation as a 1-leader, 1-follower, Bayesian game where there is one leader type and an arbitrary number of follower types. A previous approach, named DOBSS, computes the Stackelberg solution for this game by solving a Mixed In...

We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches, we consider a network with an arbitrary topology, and we handle the fact that users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed...

We consider a hierarchical game theoretic model for cognitive radio (CR) networks in which primary users (PU) set the price to charge secondary users (SU) for accessing the licensed spectrum and SUs optimize their transmit powers according to the price imposed by PUs. Pricing strategies can be tailored to steer SUs to a Stackelberg equilibrium. We establish a coalition formation game framework ...

We investigate the solvability of the reverse Stackelberg game. Here, a leader player acts first by presenting a leader function that maps the follower decision space into the leader decision space. Subsequently, the follower acts by determining his optimal decision variable. Such a game setting can be adopted within a multi-level optimization approach for large-scale control problems like road...

Game-theoretic security resource allocation problems have generated significant interest in the area of designing and developing security systems. These approaches traditionally utilize the Stackelberg game model for security resource scheduling in order to improve the protection of critical assets. The basic assumption in Stackelberg games is that a defender will act first, then an attacker wi...

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept prescribing for a player an optimal strategy to commit to, assuming the opponent knows this commitment and plays the best response. Although this solution concept is a cornerstone of many security applications, the existing works typically do not consider situations where the players can observe and react to the actions of the opponent during the co...

It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to think of the former as a truly separate solution concept, or should we entirely subordinate it to the latter? The answer probably depends on the particular circumstances, and indeed the literature takes diffe...

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of a mixed equilibrium. We compare the predictions in various classes of evolutionary and learning proc...

This work consider the problem of flow control using incentive strategy in Stackelberg game theory. The network model employed here is that users route their flows from a common source to a common destination node, each of them trying to optimize its individual performance objective. First, the existing Stackelberg routing strategy is briefly introduced. And then, the linear Stackelberg incenti...