We show that in large finite economies, core allocations can be approximately decentralized as Nash (rather than Walras) equilibrium. We argue that this exercise is an essential complement to asymptotic core equivalence results, because it implies that in some approximate sense individual attempts to manipulate the decentralizing prices cannot be beneficial, which fits precisely the interpretat...

In this note we consider a general equilibrium model with oligopolistic competition between firms who ignore the feedback effect of their dividend payments on demand. The outcome of this competition coincides with the perfectly competitive equilibrium solution, provided that firms have identical production technologies. I would like to thank Atsushi Kajii and two anonymous referees for helpful ...

In the glorious decade running from 1871 to 1881, Jevons, Walras, and Edgeworth laid the foundations of most modern microeconomic analysis: in his Theory of Political Economy (1 edition 1871, 2 edition 1879; henceforth TPE ), not only did Jevons formalise for the …rst time, by means of his celebrated "equations of exchange", the conditions de…ning the equilibrium of a pure-exchange two-commodit...

The existence of Nash and Walras equilibrium is proved via Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, without recourse to Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem for correspondences. The domain of the Walras fixed point map is confined to the price simplex, even when there is production and weakly quasi-convex preferences. The key idea is to replace optimization with " satisficing improvement, " i.e., to replace th...

We show that in large …nite economies, core allocations can be approximately decentralized as Nash (rather than Walras) equilibrium. We argue that this exercise is an essential complement to asymptotic core equivalence results, because it implies that in some approximate sense individual attempts to manipulate the decentralizing prices cannot be bene…cial, which …ts precisely the interpretation...