In authoritarian regimes election polls can be vastly polluted by measurement error, namely the social desirability bias, which can contribute to substantial inflation in the publicized estimates of an autocrat’s electoral support and voter turnout. This study provides an in-depth analysis of the magnitude of social desirability bias in polling estimates released before and after the 2012 Russi...

All voter-verifiable voting schemes in the literature require that the voter be able to see and to mark. This paper describes modifications to the Prêt à Voter and PunchScan schemes so that a voter who can either see or hear, or both, independent of marking ability, may avail of voter-verifiability without revealing her vote. The modified systems would provide privacy and integrity guarantees t...

For digital circuit/system architectures, the triple modular redundancy (TMR) scheme is widely used to cope with circuit/system faults. The TMR scheme involves duplication of a circuit/system twice and the majority voter, based on Boolean majority logic, ensures that the architecture remains functional even if any copy of circuit/system may become faulty at any time. However, the fundamental as...

Voter registration is an important issue in election processes. In order to protect the election accuracy, it is necessary to have an accurate electoral roll of eligible voters. The electoral roll is usually constructed by means of a voter registration system that compiles voter data either in person or remotely. Current solutions for remote voter registration lack effective methods to prevent ...

Privacy is a necessary requirement for voting. Without privacy, voters can be forced to vote in specific ways, and the forcing party can check their compliance. But offering privacy does not suffice: if a voter can reduce her privacy, an attacker can force her to do so. In this paper, we distinguish various ways that a voter can communicate with the intruder to reduce her privacy and classify t...

Example 6.1 Consider an election with three alternatives, a, b, and c, and three voters, 1, 2, and 3. Suppose the rule used is plurality—an alternative gets a point each time it is ranked first by a voter, and the alternative with the most points wins—with ties broken towards alternatives earlier in the alphabet. Suppose voter 3 knows (or strongly suspects) that voter 1 will rank a first in her...

Abstract Traditional voting procedures are non‐remote, time‐consuming, and less secure. While the voter believes their vote was submitted successfully, authority does not provide evidence that counted tallied. In most cases, anonymity of a is also sure, as voter's details included in ballot papers. Many voters consider this system untrustworthy manipulative, discouraging them from voting, conse...

A voting scheme constitutes an essential component of many fault tolerant systems. Two types of voters are commonly used in applications of real-valued systems: the inexact majority and the amalgamating voters. The inexact majority voter effectively isolates erroneous modules and is capable of reporting benign outputs when a significant disagreement is detected. However, an application specific...