The practical Internet voting protocols should have: privacy, completeness, soundness, unreusability, fairness, eligibility, and invariableness, universal verifiability, receipt-freeness, and coercion-resistance. Privacy describes the fact that a particular vote in a particular way is not revealed to anyone. Receipt-freeness means that the voter can not produce a receipt to prove that he votes ...

Electronic voting promises the possibility of a convenient, efficient and secure facility for recording and tallying votes in an election. Recently highlighted inadequacies of implemented systems have demonstrated the importance of formally verifying the underlying voting protocols. The applied pi calculus is a formalism for modelling such protocols, and allows us to verify properties by using ...

We propose an epistemic logic for the applied pi calculus, which is a variant of the pi calculus with extensions for modeling cryptographic protocols. In such a calculus, the security guarantees are usually stated as observational equivalence. While process calculi provide a natural means to describe the protocols themselves, epistemic logics are often better suited for expressing certain secur...

Electronic voting promises the possibility of a convenient, efficient and secure facility for recording and tallying votes in an election. Recently highlighted inadequacies of implemented systems have demonstrated the importance of formally verifying the underlying voting protocols. The applied pi calculus is a formalism for modelling such protocols, and allows us to verify properties by using ...

Trusted computing technologies may play a key role for cloud security as they enable users to relax the trustworthiness assumptions about the provider that operates the physical cloud infrastructure. This work focuses on the possibility of embodying Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) devices in cloud-based infrastructures, where they can bene t computeintensive workloads like data compression...

We present a formalisation in Agda of the theory of concurrent transitions, residuation, and causal equivalence of traces for the π-calculus. Our formalisation employs de Bruijn indices and dependently-typed syntax, and aligns the “proved transitions” proposed by Boudol and Castellani in the context of CCS with the proof terms naturally present in Agda’s representation of the labelled transitio...

We model networked storage systems with distributed, cryptographically enforced file-access control in an applied pi calculus. The calculus contains cryptographic primitives and supports file-system constructs, including access revocation. We establish that the networked storage systems implement simpler, centralized storage specifications with local access-control checks. More specifically, we...