In a symmetric independent private values setting a sealed-bid double auction dissolves a partnership e¢ciently. This well known result remains valid in a model with interdependent valuations. However, if the interdependent components of valuations are large agents might prefer not to participate in a double auction. Therefore a simple extention of the rules of double-auctions is suggested that...

T majority of reverse auctions for procurement use a single-attribute (price) format while providing constraints on nonprice attributes such as quality and lead time. Alternatively, a buyer could choose to conduct a multiattribute auction where bidders can specify both a price and levels of nonprice attributes. While such an auction may provide higher theoretical utility to the buyer, it is not...

Truthful bidding is a desirable property for continuous double auctions (CDAs). Many incentive mechanisms have been proposed to elicit truthful bids. However, existing truthful CDA mechanisms often overlook the possibility that sellers may choose not to deliver the auctioned items to buyers as promised. In this situation, buyers may become unwilling to bid their true valuations in the future to...

T paper proposes an agent competition double-auction mechanism to simplify decision making and promote transactions for the customer-to-customer marketplaces. Under the proposed double-auction mechanism, bidding one’s true valuation (private information) is the best strategy for each individual buyer and seller even when shipping costs and sales taxes are different across various possible trans...

We study the problem of mechanism design for a double auction market where multiple buyers and sellers buy and sell a commodity. We design and implement a matching algorithm that maximizes market liquidity, including the number of transactions and buy/sell-volume. We prove that, given the number of matches, the algorithm also maximizes auctioneer’s profit. Based on the CAT Tournament (Trading A...

We modify W. Vickrey's (1961, J. Finance 16, 8 37) mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism. We provide sufficient conditions under which the modified Vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency. In addition, we prove that the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full e...

This paper reports the results of a series of oral double auction experiments in which some traders possess market power. A market is set up in which the configuration of supply and demand curves leads to an asymmetry between buyers and sellers in their abilities to influence transactions prices. This market structure does not always lead to convergence to the competitive price despite the comp...

In this paper we explore how specific aspects of mechanism design affect the efficiency of the market outcome. In particular, we are interested whether the availability of information about actions of other participants improves market efficiency. We consider a simple market of a homogeneous good populated by buyers and sellers. The valuations of the buyers and the costs of the sellers are give...

The vast majority of electronic markets have been based purely on a single variable (price) as the factor that determines ‘the winner’. Multi-attribute auctions are likely to be more appropriate for procurement scenarios where factors other than price need to be considered in determining the outcome. Nevertheless, there is a scarcity of empirical research on multi-attribute electronic auctions....