Electricity Price Forecasting (EPF) IS A branch of forecasting at the interface electrical engineering, statistics, computer science, and finance that focuses on predicting prices in wholesale electricity markets for a whole spectrum horizons. These range from few minutes (real-time/intraday auctions continuous trading); through days (day-ahead [DA] auctions); to weeks, months, or even years (e...

The proliferation of online auctions has attracted significant research interest in understanding real-life bidding behavior. However, most of the empirical work has focused on business-to-consumer (B2C) auctions. A natural question is whether the findings obtained from B2C auctions are applicable to business-to-business (B2B) auctions which often involve much higher stakes. In this paper, we e...

The recent growth of business-to-consumer (B2C) Internet auctions challenges researchers to develop empirically-sound explanations of critical factors that allow merchants to earn price premiums in these auctions. The absence of a comprehensive model of Internet auctions leads us to conduct an exploratory study to elucidate and rank critical factors that lead to price premiums in Internet aucti...

When second-price auctions have been conducted in the laboratory, most of the observed bids have been “overbids” (bids that exceed the bidder’s value) and there are very few underbids. Few if any of the subjects in those experiments had any prior experience bidding in auctions. We report on sealed-bid second-price auctions that we conducted on the Internet using subjects with substantial prior ...

This paper analyzes bidding data of IPO auctions held in Taiwan to address three questions. First, several studies on bookbuilding IPOs have shown that allocation policies favor institutional investors. Would auctions be a fairer mechanism to retail investors? Second, Sherman (2002) argues that bookbuilding has an edge over auctions in IPO pricing. What empirical evidence can be offered to sugg...

We explore how taste projection—the tendency to overestimate similar others’ tastes are one’s own—affects bidding in auctions. In first-price auctions with private values, projection leads bidders exaggerate the intensity of competition and, consequently, overbid—irrespective whether values independent, affiliated, or (a)symmetric. Moreover, optimal reserve price is lower than rational benchmar...

Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) have recently generated significant interest as an automated mechanism for buying and selling bundles of goods. They are proving to be extremely useful in numerous e-business applications such as e-selling, e-procurement, e-logistics, and B2B exchanges. In this article, we introduce combinatorial auctions and bring out important issues in the design of combinatorial...

We study the question of institutional choice—auctions or negotiations?—in a particular industry: the American cattle market. We consider the possibility that collusion in auctions is driving cattle producers away from auctions and towards negotiations. We provide a model that captures many key features of the industry and lays the groundwork for future work that could encapsulate many other fa...

This paper explores the feasibility and motivation for online combinatorial auctions. It explains combinatorial auctions and shows an innovative implementation of an iterative combinatorial auction. It then introduces online auctions and highlights some research which bounds the efficiency and revenue comparison to the standard Vickrey auction. Finally, motivations for online combinatorial auct...

In this lecture, we study several types of auctions, and we introduce the Envelope Theorem (E.T.) to analyze the payoffs for the auctions. The expected payoff in each case is found to be the expectation of the second highest valuation. The VickreyClarke-Grove (VCG) allocation mechanism is used in a generalized scenario of the auctions, and it produces a dominant strategy with the resulting Nash...