We compare bargaining solutions in terms of the relevance of alternatives. We show that most well-known bargaining solutions do not use all the alternatives, but there are numerous bargaining solutions that do. We introduce a new class of bargaining solutions called ``average alternative solutions'', characterize them, and show that the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are limit...

In experiments it is typically found that many joint utility outcomes arise in any given unstructured bargaining game. This suggests using a positive unstructured bargaining concept that maps a bargaining game to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than to a single outcome. We show how to “translate” Nash’s bargaining axioms to apply to such distributional bargaining concepts. We th...

Pattern bargaining is a negotiating strategy that is often employed by industry-wide unions in oligopolistic industries to set wages. The conventional wisdom is that pattern bargaining “takes labor out of competition” and therefore softens bargaining between the union and firms, resulting in higher industry wide wages. However, this does not explain why firms agree to pattern bargaining. We int...

By refering to the Bargaining Problem the economic literature means a situation in which a group of individuals seek to reach an agreement on a partition of a pie. Following Nash (1950) the two players bargaining problem is described using only two components (S, d) when d is a point in the plane which can be interpreted as the outcome when no agreement is reached and S is a compact convex subs...

We study bargaining on the division of a surplus in the presence of monotonicity constraints. The monotonicity constraints specify a complete order on the players, which has to be respected by the shares in the surplus the players obtain in any bargaining outcome. A player higher in the order should not receive a lower share of the surplus. We analyze the resulting subgame perfect equilibria in...

We examine multilateral bargaining in vertical supply relationships which involve an upstream manufacturer who sells through two competing retailers to end consumers. In these relationships the negotiations are inter-dependent and a bargaining externality may arise across the retailers. In addition, the timing by which the manufacturer negotiates with the retailers becomes important. The manufa...

In Bargaining Theory players di¤er from one another in either their valuation for the negotiated object and/or their time preferences. We suggest a model that incorporates "bargaining ability" as another source for heterogeneity across players. This bargaining ability for the buyer determines how many o¤ers he will be able to turn down before he walks away. For the seller this ability determine...

Farrell’s comparison of Coasean bargaining under incomplete information with second-best centralized regulation is reconsidered by introducing unsure property rights. Rights are unsure, because environmental law is typically incomplete, meaning that the outcome of taking action against environmental regulation is unsure ex ante. I will explore the efficiency implications of a standing to sue fo...

This study proposes a negotiation mechanism that applies TD-based reinforcement learning to deal with on-line bargaining between two parties both with incomplete information. The agent embedded with the TD-based reinforcement learning capability can learn dynamic strategy incrementally by itself with the past bargaining experiences. This study investigates the scenarios that a TD-based seller a...