This paper studies duopolistic competition under dynamic price and production quantity postponement for two differentiable products, which share common components from one supplier at a certain degree of substitution. Both price and quantity postponement is benchmarked according to the Bertrand and Cournot Stackelberg game. In addition, system dynamic is applied to show the long term effect of ...

This paper provides a simple model of endogenous horizontal product differentiation that has two important implications. First, the model can explain the “empirical Bertrand paradox” – the failure to observe homogeneous product Bertrand oligopoly. If product differentiation is possible at reasonable cost, then Bertrand firms would always invest in product differentiation. Using a quadratic util...

Immunization against infectious diseases is the single factor that has had the most considerable impact on world health. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is the primary public health organization responsible for research, analysis, and fulfillment of immunization programs. A small number of vaccine manufacturers produce all the pediatric vaccines requir...

We study how continuous time Bertrand and Cournot competitions, in which firms producing similar goods compete with one another by setting prices or quantities respectively, can be analyzed as continuum dynamic mean field games. Interactions are of mean field type in the sense that the demand faced by a producer is affected by the others through their average price or quantity. Motivated by ene...

We study continuous time Bertrand oligopolies in which a small number of firms producing similar goods compete with one another by setting prices. We first analyze a static version of this game in order to better understand the strategies played in the dynamic setting. Within the static game, we characterize the Nash equilibrium when there are N players with heterogeneous costs. In the dynamic ...

ALEXANDRE H. HIRZEL*†, BERTRAND POSSE‡, PIERRE-ALAIN OGGIER‡, YVON CRETTENAND§, CHRISTIAN GLENZ¶ and RAPHAËL ARLETTAZ*‡** * Zoological Institute–Conservation Biology, University of Bern, Baltzerstrasse 6, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland; † Laboratory of Conservation Biology, Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland; ‡ Bearded Vulture Network Western S...

We consider a simultaneous-move, dynamic entry game. The ...xed cost of entry is private information. Entering earlier increases the likelihood of being the monopolist, but also increases the likelihood of coordination failure and simultaneous entry. We consider general continuous distributions for the ...xed cost, and characterize the unique symmetric sequential equilibrium in pure strategies....

Cognitive radio (CR) is a new paradigm that utilizes the available spectrum band. The key characteristic of CR system is to sense the electromagnetic environment to adapt their operation and dynamically vary its radio operating parameters. The technique of dynamically accessing the unused spectrum band is known as Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA). The dynamic spectrum access technology helps to mi...

We study dynamic games with private information. After any history, signaling reveals information that helps players coordinate their future actions, but also makes the problem of predicting the informed player’s actions harder for the uninformed player. In equilibrium, the informed player may play aggressive or uncooperative actions, but his partner only tolerates a certain number of such acti...

A Cournot-Bertrand mixed duopoly game model with limited information about the market and opponent is considered, where the market has linear demand and two firms have the same fixed marginal cost. The principles of decision-making are bounded rational. One firm chooses output and the other chooses price as decision variable, with the assumption that there is a certain degree of differentiation...