We investigate the economic outcomes that result under simulated bidder behavior in a model of the FCC’s reverse auction for radio spectrum. In our simulations, limiting our notion of efficiency to the reverse auction in isolation, the reverse clock auction achieves very efficient solutions, the FCC’s scoring rule greatly reduces the total payments to TV broadcasters at the cost of some efficie...

In a combinatorial auction, multiple items are for sale simultaneously to a set of buyers. These buyers are allowed to place bids on subsets of the available items. A special kind of combinatorial auction is the so-called matrix bid auction, which was developed by Day (2004). The matrix bid auction imposes restrictions on what a bidder can bid for a subsets of the items. This paper focusses on ...

Ask prices are the most essential form of information feedback in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions (ICA) and vital in achieving an efficient auction outcome. Different pricing concepts have been analyzed in the literature, including linear, non-linear and discriminative non-linear prices. Linear prices, i.e. per-item prices, are intuitive and easy to understand for bidders, however, under certa...

Ascending price auctions typically involve a single price path with buyers paying their final bid price. Using this traditional definition, no ascending price auction can achieve the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome for general private valuations in the combinatorial auction setting. We relax this definition by allowing discounts to buyers from the final price of the auction (or alternativel...

Received (received date) Revised (revised date) Accepted (accepted date) We address the equilibrium concept of a reverse auction game so that no one can enhance the individual payoff by a unilateral change when all the others follow a certain strategy. In this approach the combinatorial possibilities to consider become very much involved even for a small number of players, which has hindered a ...

Rent-seeking behavior by participants in payment for environmental services auctions reduces the number of affordable contracts and decreases environmental protection. I propose a new auction mechanism, the provision point reverse auction (PPRA), to mitigate this rent-seeking behavior. The PPRA includes a public component where the probability of contract acceptance for one individual is affect...