نتایج جستجو برای: d43

تعداد نتایج: 492  

2014
Mie Kobayashi-Ishihara Hitoshi Takahashi Kazuo Ohnishi Kengo Nishimura Kazutaka Terahara Manabu Ato Shigeyuki Itamura Tsutomu Kageyama Yasuko Tsunetsugu-Yokota

There is an urgent need for a rapid diagnostic system to detect the H5 subtype of the influenza A virus. We previously developed monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) against the H5 hemagglutinin (HA) for use in a rapid diagnostic kit. In this study, we determined the epitopes of the anti-H5 HA murine mAbs OM-b, AY-2C2, and YH-1A1. Binding assays of the mAbs to different strains of H5 HAs indicated that...

2015
Simon P. Anderson Martin Peitz

We customize the aggregative game approach to oligopoly to study asymmetric media markets. Advertiser, platform, and consumer surplus are tied together by a simple summary statistic. When media are ad-financed and ads are a nuisance to consumers we establish see-saws between consumers and advertisers. Entry of a lower-quality platform increases consumer surplus, but decreases advertiser surplus...

2002
Massimo Baldini Luca Lambertini

We illustrate two differential oligopoly games using, respectively, the capital accumulation dynamics à la Solow-Nerlove-Arrow, and the capital accumulation dynamics à la Ramsey. In both settings, we evaluate the effects of (gross) profit taxation, proving that there exist tax rates yielding the same steady state social welfare as under social planning. Contrary to the static approach, our dyna...

2005
Steffen H. Hoernig

We analyze how sharing rules affect Nash equilibria in Bertrand games, where the sharing of profits at ties is a decisive assumption. Necessary conditions for either positive or zero equilibrium profits are derived. Zero profit equilibria are shown to exist under weak conditions if the sharing rule is “sign-preserving”. For Bertrand markets we define the class of “expectation sharing rules”, wh...

2014
Atsuhiro Satoh Yasuhito Tanaka

This study derives pure strategy Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly in which two firms produce a homogeneous good with convex cost functions and seek to maximize the weighted sum of their absolute and relative profits. The study shows that there exists a range of equilibrium prices in duopolistic equilibria. This range of equilibrium prices is narrower and lower than the range of equilibrium pric...

2014
Daniel Quint

Several recent technological standards were accompanied by patent pools—arrangements to license relevant intellectual property as a package. A key distinction made by regulators—between patents essential to a standard and patents with substitutes—has not been addressed in the theoretical literature. I show that pools of essential patents are always welfare increasing, while pools which include ...

2009

We offer a new perspective on games of irreversible investment under uncertainty in continuous time. The basis is a particular approach to solve the involved stochastic optimal control problems which allows to establish existence and uniqueness of an oligopolistic open loop equilibrium in a very general framework without reliance on any Markovian property. It simultaneously induces quite natura...

2004
Dermot Leahy

We introduce the concept of cooperative substitutes and complements, and use it to throw light on the conditions for a research joint venture to choose equal levels of R&D by all member firms. We show that the second-order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form, ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity, and nest...

2002
Paul Madden Leo Kaas

We show that equilibrium involuntary unemployment emerges in a multi– stage game model where all market power resides with firms, on both the labour and the output market. Firms decide wages, employment, output and prices, and under constant returns there exists a continuum of subgame perfect Nash equilibria involving unemployment and positive profits. A firm does not undercut the equilibrium w...

2009
Jingang Zhao

This paper solves merger formation problem in Cournot oligopolies by a cooperative and computational approach. In three-firm linear oligopolies, monopoly will be formed (or be stable) if its merging cost is sufficiently low and cost differentials are sufficiently large. When monopoly is unprofitable due to high merging costs, a profitable two-member merger will be formed if its efficient member...

نمودار تعداد نتایج جستجو در هر سال

با کلیک روی نمودار نتایج را به سال انتشار فیلتر کنید