The optimal bidding strategy for a generation company is a complex decision making problem involving numerous uncertainties. Generally, all market participants attempt to refine their strategies to earn greater profit. Success in the market requires not only successful forecasting of demand and other market conditions but also anticipating rival behaviours. The main objective of this paper is t...

The increasing use of auctions as a selling mechanism has led to a growing interest in the subject. Thus both auction theory and experimental examinations of these theories are being developed. A recent method used for carrying out examinations on auctions has been the design of computational simulations. The aim of this article is to develop a genetic algorithm to find automatically a bidder o...

The paper studies the impacts of learning behaviour of electrical-power suppliers on electricity-spot-market equilibrium under repeated linear supply-function bidding. In the markets, the supplier will conduct ‘learning’ to improve his strategic bidding in order to obtain greater profit. Therefore, it is significant to explore the impacts of such learning behaviour on market equilibria and mark...

Last lecture we discussed two simple auction scenarios — identical items with unit-demand bidders, and non-identical items with bidders with additive valuations. In both scenarios, we gave an ascending auction that is ex post incentive compatible (EPIC) — meaning sincere bidding by every bidder is an ex post Nash equilibrium (EPNE) with guaranteed non-negative utility — and that maximizes the w...

In this paper we show that fixed-term contracts, which are commonly used to franchise highways, do not allocate demand risk optimally. We characterize the optimal risk-sharing contract and show that it can be implemented with a fairly straightforward mechanism—a least-present-value-of-revenue auction. Instead of bidding on tolls (or franchise lengths), as in the case of fixed-term franchises, i...

Auctions are an area of great academic and commercial interest, from tiny auctions for toys on eBay to multi-billion-dollar auctions held by governments for resources or contracts. Although there has been significant research on auction theory, especially from the perspective of auction mechanisms, studies of autonomous bidding agents and their interactions are relatively few and recent. This p...

As a matter of course, power market uncertainties escalation is by product of power industry restructure on one hand and the unrivalled penetration of renewable energies on the other. Generally, the decision making process in such an uncertain environment faces with different risks. In addition, the performance of real power markets is very close to oligopoly markets, in which, some market play...

We propose a new scheme for efficient demand side management for the Smart Grid. Specifically, we envisage and promote the formation of cooperatives of medium-large consumers and equip them (via our proposed mechanisms) with the capability of regularly participating in the existing electricity markets by providing electricity demand reduction services to the Grid. Based on mechanism design prin...

The first scenario — identical items and unit-demand valuations — corresponds to special case in which μi(j) = 0 for all i and j ≥ 2. The second and third scenarios — which have non-identical goods but restrict to additive or unit-demand valuations, respectively — are incomparable to this one. Our goals are the usual ones — a simple ascending auction that is EPIC and in which sincere bidding le...