Abstract We naturally see ourselves as capable of being active with respect to the matter what we believe – epistemic agency. A natural view is that can exercise such agency by engaging in reasoning. Sceptics contend a cannot be maintained light fact reasoning involves judgements, which are not decided upon or products prior intentions. In response, I argue amount virtue its aim‐directed way re...

I argue that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism and show two leading approaches (Coliva’s acceptance account Pritchard’s non-doxastic account) are vulnerable form incommensurability leads relativism. Building on both accounts, introduce new, minimally conception hinges avoids rationally resolves disagreements. According my proposed account, putative cas...

Abstract Following Robert Adams's account of idolatry, this paper develops the concept epistemic idolatry. Where there is devotion belonging to truth but given a particular good, we find With in hand, motivationalist virtue epistemologists gain two theoretical advantages: their list defective motives can include intellectual motivation excess without implausible claim that, intellectually, one ...

Abstract Scientists imagine for epistemic reasons, and these imaginings can be better or worse. But what does it mean an imagining to epistemically worse? There are at least three metaepistemological frameworks that offer different answers this question: epistemological consequentialism, deontic epistemology, virtue epistemology. This paper presents empirical evidence scientists adopt each of w...

Perceptual experience usually comes with “phenomenal force”, a strong sense that it reflects reality as is. Some philosophers have argued is in virtue of possessing phenomenal force perceptual experiences are able to non-inferentially justify beliefs. In this article, I introduce an alternative, inferentialist take on the epistemic role force. Drawing Bayesian modeling cognitive science, argue ...

Abstract This paper develops a novel, functionalist, unified account of the epistemic normativity reasoning. On this view, norms drop out functions. I argue that practical reasoning serves prudential function generating prudentially permissible action, and knowledge what one ought to do. picture, if right, goes long way towards normatively divorcing action At same time, it unifies epistemically...

On the epistemic entrenchment of different types of knowledge expressed as conditionals in belief revision tasks Renée Elio Abstract Some belief revision theories appeal to the notion of epistemic entrenchment as a guide to choosing among alternative ways of removing inconsistency that new information may cause with existing beliefs. While belief revision theorists may not be interested in natu...

Abstract Highly idealized models may serve various epistemic functions, notably explanation, in virtue of representing the world. Inferentialism provides a prima facie compelling characterization what constitutes representation relation. In this paper, I argue that call factive inferentialism does not provide satisfactory solution to puzzle model-based—factive—explanation. particular, show maki...

This paper explores how open-mindedness and its exercise can be social in nature. In particular, it argues that an individual regarded as open-minded even though she does not conduct all of the intellectual tasks required by herself; is, delegates some these to her epistemic peers. Thinking about such terms only opens up possibility there are different surprising ways for open-minded, but also ...

Abstract In their “Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance” Kotzee, Carter and Siegel (2019) argue against what they call the intellectual virtues (IV) approach to primary epistemic aim of education in favor critical thinking (CT) approach. The IV says that educating virtue is education. CT it thinking. They exemplarist/role-modeling pedagogy not sufficiently action-g...