Is executive compensation influenced by the composition of the board of directors? About 8% of chief executive officers (CEOs) are reciprocally interlocked with another CEO—the current CEO of firm A serves as a director of firm B and the current CEO of firm B serves as a director of firm A. Roughly 20% of firms have at least one current or retired employee sitting on the board of another firm a...

We examine the impact of board structure on executive pay for 1,880 UK public firms over 1983-2002, using panel data analysis. Firstly, the proportion of non-executive directors tends to decrease the rate of increase in executive pay whilst board size tends to increase it. Secondly, the proportion of non-executives strengthens the relation between the rate of increase in executive pay and chang...

This paper examines whether links between inside and outside directors have an impact on CEO compensation. Using a comprehensive sample of 22,074 directors for 3,114 firms, we develop a measure of the " back door " distance between each pair of directors on a company's board. Specifically, using the entire network of directors and firms, we compute the minimum number of other company boards tha...

Based on extensive qualitative data, this article explores nonprofit executive and program directors’ knowledge and views of welfare reform, including how their levels of knowledge affect their ability to advocate for clients and to plan proactively. Overall, the findings suggest that the majority of the respondents do not have a comprehensive understanding of the welfare rules. Analyses furthe...

This study empirically analyzes the relationship between Vietnamese firms’ earnings management, board characteristics, and ownership structures. I use size proportion of outside directors to reflect percentages directors, chief executive officer (CEO) discretionary accruals, measured by modified Jones model, proxy for management. From analyzing firms listed on Ho Chi Minh Hanoi Stock Exchanges ...

This paper examines the effects of director labor markets at firm headquarter locations on board governance. We argue that firms can implement better board governance by drawing on local director talent when a larger pool of prospective directors (officers and directors of same-industry firms, financial institutions, and universities) is located near the firm. We find that firms located near la...

This paper examines the relationship between the board structure of UK firms and the accuracy of individual analysts’ earnings forecasts with respect to information asymmetry and agency theory. We hypothesize that managers of firms complying with the recommendations of The Code of Best Practice may have “less to hide” and, subsequently, provide more information to outsiders (including analysts)...

This paper examines a combined set of corporate governance features that influence disclosure quality in a context of ownership concentration. Agency theory presents a theoretical framework linking disclosure decision to corporate governance mechanisms. Using a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), we find that firms with poor disclosure quality have higher ownership concentration, are family...

Using an international sample of firms, we investigate the career prospects directors firms experiencing negative ESG issues. By tracking same director at firm over time, document a significant drop in seats held other public firms’ boards following intense media coverage problem occurring given director's focal firm. Losses are concentrated among executive directors, located countries with hig...

We investigate the reputational consequences for directors of firms that receive a low-support Say-on-Pay (SOP) vote. These affected face significantly greater likelihood losing board seats, both at voting firm and in external labor market. However, penalties are not equal all directors. Directors who serve on compensation committees with high chief executive officer pay suffer internal penalti...