I study the speed of the evolutionary process on small heterogeneous graphs using the Hawk-Dove game. The graphs are based on empirical observation data of grooming interactions in 81 primate groups. Analytic results for the star graph have revealed that irregular graphs can slow down the evolutionary process by increasing the mean time to absorption. Here I show that the same effects can be fo...

Suppose that a large number of individuals are randomly matched into groups where each group plays a finite symmetric game. Individuals breed true according to their individual material payoffs, but the expected number of surviving offspring may depend on the material payoff vector to the whole group. We show that the mean-field equation for the induced population dynamic is equivalent to the r...

In this work we present a predator-prey model that incorporates individual behavior of the predators. A classical Lotka-Volterra model with self-limiting prey describes the predator-prey interaction. Predator individuals can use two behavioral tactics to dispute a prey when they meet, the classical hawk and dove tactics. Each individual can use both tactics along its life. The predator behavior...

In this work we present a predator–prey model that incorporates individual behavior of the predators. A classical Lotka–Volterra model with self-limiting prey describes the predator–prey interaction. Predator individuals can use two behavioral tactics to dispute a prey when they meet, the classical hawk and dove tactics. Each individual can use both tactics along its life. The predator behavior...

We study the evolution of a pair of competing behavioural alleles in a structured population when there are non-additive or 'synergistic' fitness effects. Under a form of weak selection and with a simple symmetry condition between a pair of competing alleles, Tarnita et al. provide a surprisingly simple condition for one allele to dominate the other. Their condition can be obtained from an anal...

Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of randomness. These temporal variations in the payoffs can affect which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics that are affected by varying payoffs r...

For years, researchers have demonstrated the viability and applicability of game theory principles to field artificial intelligence. Furthermore, has been shown as a useful tool for researching human-machine interaction, specifically their cooperation, by creating an environment where cooperation can initially form before reaching continuous stable presence in system. Additionally, recent devel...