We study two-player one-dimensional discrete Hotelling pure location games assuming that demand f ( d ) as a function of distance is constant or strictly decreasing. show this game admits best-response potential. This result holds in particular for = w with 0 < ? 1. For case special attention will be given to the structure equilibrium set and conjecture about increasingness correspondences m...

Abstract We study an N -player game where a pure action of each player is to select nonnegative function on Polish space supporting finite diffuse measure, subject constraint the integral function. This used define intensity Poisson point process space. The processes are independent over players, and value measure union her open Voronoi cells in superposition process. Under randomized strategie...

Abstract We investigate an extension of the Hotelling–Downs model to case where preferences voters do not have be single peaked. In candidates only care about winning or losing, assuming that a voter elects each candidate symmetrically with equal probability when indifferent, previous works by Fisher and Ryan Laffond, Laslier, Le Breton shown equilibrium outcome is unique. Uniqueness also holds...

We consider the problem of a monopolist seller who is selling a good to a potential buyer and is privately informed about some of the good’s attributes. We focus on the case where goods with di¤erent attributes are horizontally di¤erentiated: they appeal di¤erently to di¤erent types of the buyer. Such a market is represented via a standard Hotelling (1929) model, where the seller’s and the buye...

The Hotelling game of pure location allows interpretations in spatial competition, political theory, and strategic forecasting. In this paper, the doubly symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for n�4 firms is characterized as the solution of a well-behaved boundary value problem. The analysis suggests that, in contrast to the cases n=3 and n→∞, the equilibrium for a finite number of n�4 firms te...