We examine a legislative voting game where decisions are to be made over both ideological and distributive dimensions. In equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together, despite having preferences that are separable over the two dimensions. The equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions, and the set of legislators who app...

My paper is based on the idea that computer games as simulations can be seen as a new kind of aesthetical realism forming a certain perception of reality and thus certain ideological statements. These statements can be found in the structural shaping of the games, in other words the rules and gameplay of a game. The investigation thus concerns the framework that the rules and gameplay provide i...

With the proliferation of user-generated articles over the web, it becomes imperative to develop automated methods that are aware of the ideological-bias implicit in a document collection. While there exist methods that can classify the ideological bias of a given document, little has been done toward understanding the nature of this bias on a topical-level. In this paper we address the problem...

We present a model in which the media endorses the character of offi ce-seeking candidates as a means to promote its own ideological agenda. In equilibrium, political parties completely pander to the elite-controlled media under moderate ideological conflict between voters and the elite. Larger ideological conflict leads to stochastic polarization– parties either adopt the role of media darling...

This paper explores the historical and ideological meanings of organized sports for the politics of gender relations. After outlining a theory for building a historically grounded understanding of sport, culture, and ideology, the paper argues that organized sports have come to serve as a primary institutional means for bolstering a challenged and faltering ideology of male superiority in the 2...

We study a model of party formation in which the informativeness of party labels and inter-party ideological heterogeneity are endogenously and jointly determined in response to electoral incentives. Parties use screening to increase the cost of affiliation for politicians whose ideal points diverge from the party platform. Because affiliation decisions are endogenous, increased screening decre...

The reasons why we as scholars prefer one paradigm to another are not only scientific but also ideological. It is suggested that pluralism should be discussed at the levels of theory of science, paradigms in economics and ideological orientations. Neoclassical economics is closely connected with logical positivism as a theory of science and is close to Neo-liberalism as an ideological orientati...

In a spatial common agency model, two asymmetric interest groups (principals) in‡uence a unique decision-maker (agent). The decision-maker chooses a onedimensional policy on behalf of those principals and has private information about his ideology after contracting with principals. The policy is always e¢ cient and re‡ects a weighted average between the principals’ and the agent’s ideal points....

We seek to measure political candidates’ ideological positioning from their speeches. To accomplish this, we infer ideological cues from a corpus of political writings annotated with known ideologies. We then represent the speeches of U.S. Presidential candidates as sequences of cues and lags (filler distinguished only by its length in words). We apply a domain-informed Bayesian HMM to infer th...