> context • The enactivist tradition, out of which neurophenomenology arose, rejects various internalisms – including the representationalist and information-processing metaphors – but remains wedded to one further internalism: the claim that the structure of perceptual experience is directly, constitutively linked only to internal, brain-based dynamics. > Problem • I aim to reject this interna...

Abstract It is commonly accepted that the definition of knowledge not among main epistemological concerns period between Plato and Edmund Gettier. Kalām an exception to rule. scholars provide a detailed philosophical analysis difference mere true belief. In this article, I am focusing on in one tradition kalām , Bahšamite Muʿtazilism. will argue factive mental state for Bahšamites. also show co...

Beer’s rich and rigorous attempt at dismantling old and deeply entrenched prejudices in cognitive science through the painstaking analysis of an evolved agent is more than welcome—especially so after a decade or more of not-quite-delivered promises from the dynamical systems approach to cognition. We are broadly in sympathy with the perspective Beer espouses, but we want to invite the author to...

Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two probl...

According to advocates of internalism about reasons for action, there is an interesting connection between an agent’s reasons and the agent’s present desires. On the simplest version of this view, an agent has a reason to act a certain way at some time if and only if acting that way would promote his present desires. Let us call this the sub-Humean model.1 The sub-Humean model is widely regarde...

Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or nonmental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two proble...

The discussion of collective agency involves the reduction problem concept a collective. Individualism and Cartesian internalism have long restricted orthodox theories made them face tension between an irreducible ontological reductionism. Heterodox as functionalism interpretationism reinterpret accept it realized on level In order to adequately explain social phenomena that relations their ess...

Abstract Wordly internalists claim that while internal duplicates always share the same evidence, our evidence includes non-trivial propositions about environment. It follows some is false. Worldly internalism thought to provide a more satisfying answer scepticism than classical internalist views deny these environment might belong and generally attractive account of rationality reasons for bel...