We present an analysis of inter-regional investment stocks within Europe from a complex networks perspective. We consider two different levels: first, we compute the inward– outward investment stocks at the level of firms, based on ownership shares and number of employees; then we estimate the inward–outward investment stock at the level of regions in Europe, by aggregating the ownership networ...

We investigate whether foreign institutional ownership impacts corporate innovation. Using firm-level data from 30 countries in 2001-2010, we find that higher foreign institutional ownership is associated with more investment in R&D and patents. Using the exogenous increase in foreign institutional holdings that follows a firm’s addition to the Morgan Stanley Capital International World Index, ...

We consider a mean-variance general equilibrium economy where the expected returns for controlling and non-controlling shareholders are different because the former are able to divert a fraction of the profits. We find that when investor protection is poor, asset return correlation affects ownership structure in a positive way. Higher return correlation lowers the benefits of diversification wh...

Cristiana Tudor∗ This study employs Enterprise Survey data to analyze business environment constraints and financing sources for investment for Romanian and Bulgarian companies at the end of 2009 and investigates the change in financing sources after the global financial crisis relative to a pre-crisis period (2005). The study also investigates whether the ownership structure of a firm affects ...

We investigate relations among inside ownership, managerial expenses, risk sharing and equity valuations. Our engine of analysis—Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)—provides a unique and rich framework for analysis since we can calculate extremely accurate measures of asset replacement costs, and hence relative valuation (Tobin’s q). Further, the nature of the financial statements allows us t...

The paper first differentiates “control” and “incentive”. Then it shows that integration in which the principal gets ownership of the physical assets necessary for the agent to create values enhances control of the principal over the agent’s human capital and thus improve coordination ex post, but that reduces the agent’s ex ante incentive to make human capital investment and ex post incentive ...