Most allocation rules for network games presented in the literature assume that the network structure is fixed. We put explicit emphasis on the construction of networks and examine the dynamic formation of networks whose evolution across time periods is stochastic. Time-series of networks are studied that describe processes of network formation where links may appear or disappear at any period....

We develop a theory of ‘behavioral communities’ and the ‘atomic structure’ of networks. We define atoms to be groups of agents whose behaviors always match each other in a set of coordination games played on the network. This provides a microfoundation for a method of detecting communities in social and economic networks. We provide theoretical results characterizing such behavior-based communi...

We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a plan for blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. The bads carried to the target ca...

Social Interactions and Labor Market Outcomes in Cities We develop a model where information about jobs is essentially obtained through friends and relatives, i.e. strong and weak ties. Workers commute to a business center to work and to interact with other people. We find that housing prices increase with the level of social interactions in the city because information about jobs is transmitte...

This paper addresses the existence of Nash networks for the one-way flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000) in a number of different settings. First, we provide conditions for the existence of Nash networks in models where costs and values of links are heterogenous and players obtain resources from others only through the directed path between them. We find that costs of establishing links play a v...

We consider an agent-based model of financial markets with asynchronous order arrival in continuous time. Buying and seeling orders arrive in accordance with a Poisson dynamics where the order rates depend both on past prices and the mood of the market. The agents form their demand for an asset on the basis of their forecasts of future prices and where their forecasting rules may change over ti...

We consider a finite population of agents who exchange information and are paired every period to play a game with tension between risk dominance and Pareto efficiency. Agents sample past plays and corresponding payoffs from their information neighborhood, and choose one of two possible actions using either best response or imitation. Information exchanges and possible matchings each constitute...

In this paper we examine the role played by different type of spillovers in network formation. More precisely, we study non-cooperative network formation in directed networks where the payoff of a player depends on the number of links she forms as well as, either on the total number of links formed by all other players, or the total number of links formed by her immediate neighbors. The first t...

The paper discusses the important role of clustering in the evolution of social networks, as it affects not only the incentives of players to cooperate but also their ability to search for fresh opportunities. Depending on the volatility of the environment and the social convention in place, we show that network clustering endogenously adapts to achieve and maintain, to the extent possible, a s...

We propose an allocation rule that takes into account the importance of players and their links and characterizes it for a fixed network. Unlike previous rules, our characterization does not require component additivity. Next, we extend it to flexible networks à la Jackson (2005). Finally, we provide a comparison with other fixed (network Myerson and Position value) and flexible network (player...